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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the U.S. Army’s current plan to create an Active Duty Civil 
Affairs Brigade within U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) to provide direct 
support to general purpose forces (GPF).  This thesis analyzes this new alignment of 
Civil Affairs forces within the U.S. Army, to determine if this is the best course of action 
considering the current and emerging operational environment, and possible effects on 
the Active Duty Civil Affairs branch.  Recommendations are given to rectify the 
problems identified, and to suggest alternate courses of action regarding the placement of 
Civil Affairs forces and their structure within the U.S. Army.  With DoD directive 3000.7 
stating that Irregular Warfare (IW) is as strategically important as traditional warfare, and 
Field Manual 3-0 stating stability operations are equivalent to both offensive and 
defensive operations, Civil Affairs will have a key role in almost all conflicts in the 
foreseeable future.  DoD Directive 3000.7 makes clear that any new Civil Affairs force 
structure formed now, will affect the U.S. Army’s ability to confront threats in the 
coming years.   
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I was to learn later in life that,  
perhaps because we are so good at organizing, we tend as a nation  
to meet any new situation by reorganizing; and a wonderful method  
it can be for creating the illusion of progress while producing  
confusion, inefficiency and demoralization.  
 — Charlton Ogburn, "Merrill's Marauders,"  
Harpers Magazine, January 1957. 
Since 2001, the ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan, and then Iraq, have been the 
catalyst for many changes in the U.S. Army.  Some of the more dramatic changes are in 
the structure, employment and overall perception of the Civil Affairs branch.  Once 
considered a minor functional area by the Army, the Civil Affairs career field has now 
moved to the forefront of operations around the globe.  The inattention to Civil Affairs 
operations by conventional commanders in the post-Vietnam era was one of the reasons 
cited for assigning the Civil Affairs branch into the special operations community in 1987 
(Marquis, 1997 p. 156).  However, since DoD directive 3000.7 states that Irregular 
Warfare (IW) is as strategically important as traditional warfare, and Field Manual 3-0 
now states stability operations are equal to both offensive and defensive operations,  Civil 
Affairs will have a key role in almost any conflict in the foreseeable future.  This thesis 
will examine the increasing importance of Civil Affairs in the context of an important 
new change under consideration.  This change would involve adding an additional Active 
Duty Civil Affairs brigade under operational control of U.S. Army Forces Command 
(FORSCOM) for the support of the conventional or general-purpose forces.   
This thesis will argue that this operational placement under FORSCOM will not 
adequately meet short-term needs, and ultimately that more harm than good will come to 
the Civil Affairs branch from this action.  The harmful results will reflect themselves in 
the form of negative second- and third-order effects, ultimately constraining the Army 
and the Civil Affairs branch.  The conclusion is that these negative effects will have 
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lasting consequences on the Civil Affairs career field and the Army’s ability to conduct 
future operations.  The reality of DoD Directive 3000.7 and the coequal status of stability 
operations make clear that any structure formed now for Civil Affairs must address long-
term requirements and must encompass more than just an attempt to meet a short-term 
need.  
B. MISSION 
The mission of Civil Affairs, as outlined in FM 3-05.40 Civil Affairs Operations 
(2006) is to provide:  
…the military commander with expertise on the civil component of the 
operational environment.  The commander uses the capabilities of Civil 
Affairs to analyze and influence the human terrain through specific 
processes and dedicated resources and personnel.  As part of the 
commander’s civil-military operations, Civil Affairs conducts operations 
in conjunction with the overall mission and intent.  The use of Civil 
Affairs significantly helps ensure the legitimacy and credibility of the 
mission, by advising how to meet the moral and legal obligations to the 
people affected by military operations.  The key to understanding the role 
of   CA is recognizing the importance of leveraging each relationship 
between the command and   every individual, group, and organization in 
the operational environment to achieve a desired effect (p. 1–1).   
During conflicts, the population is always the “decisive point” for Civil Affairs 
personnel.1  This trait makes them an important component in any conflict, but essential 
in counterinsurgency, insurgency, and irregular warfare.  In this zero-sum atmosphere, in 
order to grow, an insurgent must take from the counterinsurgents’ support base.  In order 
to do so, the insurgent needs the population.  If the insurgent can control the population 
and get its active support, the insurgent will win.  The same holds true for the 
counterinsurgent at the opposite end of the spectrum (Galula, 1967, p. 4).  In short, one 
must lose something in order for the other to gain.  Having additional resources may 
assist but will not change the rules of the game.  Active Civil Affairs assets can provide 
                                                 
1 Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines 
decisive point as a geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, 
allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving 
success (JP 1-02, 2009, p. 148.) 
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either the insurgent or counterinsurgent with ways and means for influencing the target 
population through access and contact by use of projects.  These projects can come in the 
form of, but are not limited to, wells, schools, and humanitarian aid.  Reserve Civil 
Affairs personnel have a much larger range of skills, thereby increasing the number of 
ways they can access the population in the long term. 
C. HISTORY 
Civil Affairs is a unique branch, not only divided by its Active and Reserve 
organizations, but by functional specialists and generalists.  For the majority of branches 
within the Army, the Reserve function of the branch is a mirror image of its Active 
counterpart in both structure and mission.  For example, a Reserve Infantry unit has the 
same overall mission as an Active Infantry unit and structured in a near-identical fashion.  
This is not the case for Active and Reserve Civil Affairs units, which have separate 
missions and structures, and make delineations between generalist and functional skill 
sets.  
CA generalists support the commander’s immediate needs by planning and 
coordinating Civil Affairs Operations that support the Civil Military Operation goals and 
objectives as outlined in the supporting Civil Military Operations strategy.  The ability to 
negotiate with local civilians and a thorough knowledge of the military decision-making 
process are critical skills of the CA generalist (FM 3-05.40 Civil Affairs Operations, p. 
1–8).   
The generalist forces are designed to meet the immediate needs of the population.  
With their regional and language skills, they have the ability to quickly imbed within a 
society, build rapport and begin the mapping of the human terrain.  However, generalists 
do not have the skill sets for reconstruction or nation building.  These skill sets reside 
within the Reserve Civil Affairs force. 
The Reserve Civil Affairs organization has functional specialists trained in areas 
such as rule of law, economic stability, governance, public health and welfare, 
infrastructure, and public education and information.  These individuals with technical 
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skill are qualified and experienced practitioners who can advise and assist commanders, 
as well as their civilian counterparts within their area of expertise (FM 3-05.40 Civil 
Affairs Operations, p. 1–9).  The Active Civil Affairs forces do not have the skills of the 
functional specialist because these skills cannot be maintained at adequate levels without 
incurring great cost.  However, for the Reserves, their personnel do these jobs in their 
civilian roles each day.  The functional specialties are considered the “crown jewels” of 
Civil Affairs (Civil Affairs Association, 2007, p. 2–1).   
Since the early 1970s, the majority of the U.S. Army’s Civil Affairs capabilities 
have been within the Reserve Component.  This was a result of a decision made by 
General Creighton Abrams, Army Chief of Staff, to move most of the Army’s combat 
service and combat service support into the Reserves as a cost saving measure.  Since 
Reserve Civil Affairs units were not considered part of the initial force package of any 
conflict, it was felt there would be no loss to the Army’s effectiveness (Hicks & 
Wormuth, 2009, p. 33). 
This separation of Civil Affairs into Reserve and Active elements led to the 
reorganization of the Active Army’s only Civil Affairs asset, the 96th Civil Affairs 
Battalion.  This Active Duty Battalion consisted of culturally and linguistically trained 
companies regionally aligned to specific Combatant Commands.  However, during the 
Cold War Era, very little emphasis was placed on Civil Affairs operations, and 
assignment into this career field was largely seen as a dead-end assignment (Hicks & 
Wormuth, 2009, p. 30).  However, Civil Affairs did have a decades-long connection to 
Special Operations, dating to the early 1960s when Civil Affairs, Psychological 
Operations and Special Forces were “special” assets under the Special Warfare 
Directorate (Krepinevich, 1988, p. 43).  During the 1980s, the Civil Affairs career field 
began to gain some recognition and support from within the Special Operations 
community.  The connection with Special Operations and the recognition received from 
this community would assist in the eventual decision as to where Civil Affairs forces 
would reside operationally. 
From the spring through the summer of 1987, the issue of where Civil Affairs 
forces would reside operationally went unresolved.  Admiral William Crowe, Chairman 
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of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, argued that, “While the missions of PSYOP and CA forces are 
broader than special operations, these forces should benefit from the resource advocacy 
that General Lindsay will provide as the unified commander” (Marquis, 1997, p. 156).  
Additionally it was determined the close relationships fostered with other special 
operations forces in areas of orientation and language training would create mutual 
benefits (Marquis, 1997, pp. 156–157).  The counter-argument stated that Civil Affairs 
operations supported both conventional and unconventional warfare, and that assignment 
to special operations would leave the conventional forces without adequate support 
(Marquis, 1997 p. 156).  After much debate, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger 
made his decision in the fall of 1987 to assign all Civil Affairs assets to 1st SOCOM, 
which eventually became the United States Army Special Operations Command 
(USASOC).  Today, the Army is again revisiting those same issues. 
On 12 January 2004, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, concerned about the 
rising violence in Iraq, issued a short memo to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
General Richard B. Meyers.  In this memo, the Secretary asked if Civil Affairs should be 
removed from the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) and placed in 
direct support of General Purpose Forces (GPF).  The Secretary felt the Regular Army 
needed to do a better job at stabilization, while other elements within Special Operations 
Command should focus more on direct action (Ricks, 2005).   
The Army attempted to meet the spirit of the Secretary of Defense’s request by 
moving Reserve Civil Affairs forces to the U.S. Army Reserve Command for eventual 
alignment with maneuver brigades, while maintaining the Active Civil Affairs forces 
under USASOC (Ricks, 2005).  By doing this, the GPF received the bulk of Civil Affairs 
assets, approximately 96%, for their support, and USASOC retained the 96th Civil Affairs 
Battalion, which had a habitual relationship with the Special Forces Groups since 1987.  
Additionally, under this agreement, the 96th, the only Active Duty Civil Affairs battalion, 





Civil Affairs skills.  The implementation of this decision occurred in 2006, in what is 
commonly referred to in the Civil Affairs community as “the divorce.”  Unfortunately, 
this decision proved less than satisfactory. 
In 2008, with the increasing demands on the U.S. armed forces due to operations 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Deputy Secretary of Defense asked for another review of 
Civil Affairs.  This review looked specifically at options for increasing Civil Affairs in 
the Active Component to support conventional forces.  From the review, it was decided 
that the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade would grow by one battalion, the Reserve Civil 
Affairs would receive an additional twenty Reserve Civil Affairs companies, and a new 
Active Component Civil Affairs brigade would be built to support conventional forces 
(Cotton, 2008). 
D. THESIS OUTLINE 
This thesis will illustrate how the decision to create a Civil Affairs brigade in 
support of General Purpose Forces could be counterproductive to the Army’s overall 
success, and why the creation of this unit would still not allow for adequate Civil Affairs 
support for conventional units in the long term.  It will also prove that any creation of an 
Active Civil Affairs unit should support Special Operations, while the continued support 
of the Reserves to General Purpose Forces would enable each to perform better in future 
conflicts.  
Chapter II of this thesis will discuss the current structure and training of Active 
Duty Civil Affairs.  This will allow the reader to become familiar with the Active branch 
as a whole and show the different skill sets that reside within the Active and Reserve 
Civil Affairs units.  The chapter will also detail both the current and future environments 
U.S. forces are and may find themselves operating.  Through this examination, a 
determination is made as to the most likely and least likely operational scenarios to 
present themselves in the next 10–15 years.   
Chapter III will analyze the Army’s proposal for creating a new Civil Affairs 
brigade within U.S. Army Forces Command.  By creating this “Dual Headquarters” for 
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Active Civil Affairs, a competition for resources arises within the branch.  From now 
until 2013, as this new Civil Affairs brigade and the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade attempt to 
grow, each will need many of the same requirements in terms of personnel and 
equipment at exactly the same time in order to achieve full operational strength.  This 
puts each Active Civil Affairs unit in direct competition with the other.   
Chapter III will further show that this “Dual Headquarters” option will not meet 
the immediate needs of Iraq and Afghanistan and will not meet the needs of the likely 
operating environment as outlined in Chapter II.  This option will continue to degrade the 
skills within the Civil Affairs branch, will not provide habitual support to conventional 
units, and will place the Army at risk in terms of its ability to deal with the future threat 
environment.   
Chapter IV will examine an alternative to the Army’s plan by examining the 
possibility of a new Civil Affairs brigade residing alongside the 95th Civil Affairs 
Brigade under the operational control of U.S. Army Special Operations Command.  This 
“Single Headquarters” alternative will not create a competition for resources between the 
two Civil Affairs Brigades.  Instead, using techniques already in practice by the 95th 
Civil Affairs Brigade, this alternative provides mission gain, as opposed to possible 
mission shortfall.  This chapter will show that this alternative best aligns the forces 
needed within the likely operating environment.  Due to uncertainty of future events, the 
less likely environment is also examined.  In each case, this alternative is able to provide 
better Civil Affairs support with the requisite skills needed for any area of operations.  
However, this alternative, like the Army’s plan, is unable to provide habitual support to 
conventional units. 
Chapter V will highlight deficiencies or shortcomings not addressed by either 
option.  The first deficiency is the inability of the Active Civil Affairs to grow a more 
robust strategic presence.  The second deficiency is the lack of habitual support to 
conventional forces provided by either option.  For both deficiencies, courses of action 
are given to address these problems.  Each course of action, however, is most easily 
achieved under the “Single Headquarters” option.  
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Chapter VI will provide conclusions and recommendations for what is best for not 
only the Civil Affairs branch, but also the Army. 
Appendix A will provide a more detailed analysis of the Reserve Civil Affairs 
component.  Any complete solution for Civil Affairs must incorporate the Reserves, due 
to the differing, yet complementary skills residing within each component.  This makes it 
impossible to formulate any solution for one without including the other.  Due to this, 
within this thesis, as on the battlefield, each component is used to assist its counterpart; 
therefore, the reader will find references to the Reserve Civil Affairs, but, due to scope, 
will not be fully addressed.  Appendix A addresses additional Reserve-specific issues in a 
more complete manner and provides possible courses of action that may assist in the 
future study of this critical component of Civil Affairs. 
Appendix B will examine the case studies of Colombia and the Philippines in 
order to provide examples of Civil Affairs operations in an emerging environment.  Each 
highlights the use of Special Operations Forces (SOF) in a preventive, small-footprint 
fashion to show the possible gains and utility of this method.  For the purposes of this 
thesis only, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and Special Forces are 
included under the term of SOF.     
E. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The purpose of this thesis is based on the belief that the focus placed on current 
operations, although essential in the near term, is decrementing the Army’s combat Civil 
Affairs capabilities in the long term.  While both SOF and GPF are equal participants in 
the current conflicts, SOF will ultimately bear the heaviest burdens in the Army’s coming 
engagements around the world.  SOF, however, lacks the manpower to meet the 
requirements of the emerging threat environment, especially within the non-lethal arena. 
While GPF will play a role, it will be more limited and will not likely include areas 
outside of what is presently seen.   
This emerging global environment will look much like the environment witnessed 
over the past twenty years.  It will look like Colombia, El Salvador, and the operations 
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currently taking place in Africa and the Philippines.  Outside of Afghanistan and Iraq, it 
will be SOF-heavy with little or no GPF involvement.  No country wants to appear 
occupied or dominated by the United States; therefore, outside of an U.S.-led invasion, a 
future involving a Brigade Combat Team led configuration, complete with requisite 
support functions, will not materialize.  Instead, it will be small footprint, 
assistance/interdiction provided without the appearance of occupation or of being overly 
influenced by the United States.   
 10
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 11
II. CURRENT ORGANIZATION AND FUTURE ENVIRONMENT 
Currently, the Active Civil Affairs component is comprised of one brigade, the 
95th Civil Affairs Brigade, located at Fort Bragg, NC, under the operational control of 
United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC).  As the 95th Civil Affairs 
Brigade took form, it mirrored the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, only on a larger scale.  
Each Battalion stood up from the company element that constituted the original 96th 
Civil Affairs Battalion, thus ensuring regional focus and skills were not lost in the 
process of expansion.  These companies, now battalions, have a long history of habitual 
relationships with the Special Forces Groups with whom they share common areas of 
operation, language capability, regional experience and, often,  personnel.  For example, 
the 98th Civil Affairs Battalion, originally Alpha Company in the 96th Civil Affairs 
Battalion, has worked extensively with 7th Special Forces Group throughout Central and 
South America, while the 97th Civil Affairs Battalion, originally Bravo Company, 96th 
Civil Affairs Battalion maintains constant rotations into the Philippines with the 1st 
Special Forces Group.  Historically the majority of Active Duty Civil Affairs missions 
have been in support of Special Operations Forces (SOF) (Hartzel, 2009).  To maintain 
these relationships Active Duty Civil Affairs personnel receive assignments directly to 
Special Forces Groups to assist in coordination and utilization of the assets.  The 95th 
Civil Affairs Brigade is still not at full operational strength, as not all battalion elements 
have formally stood up.  This process will take another two years with an expected 
completion in Fiscal Year 2012 (95th Civil Affairs Brigade, 2009).  Growth within Civil 
Affairs will be continual until approximately 2013, causing an increased need for 
qualified personnel. 
Civil Affairs officers are selected from the Army’s basic branches annually 
through a board process.  Within an officer’s career timeline, this process occurs between 
the third and fourth year of commissioned service.  The board is comprised of former or 
sitting battalion commanders from Civil Affairs, Special Forces and Psychological 
Operations.  Each individual candidate’s records are reviewed and all are scored on 
performance, potential, skills and experience.  Through this screening, an order of merit 
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list is created and officers are then selected to attend Civil Affairs training.  The process 
of taking an officer from his or her basic branch and sending them through Civil Affairs 
training at the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS) 
to become a Civil Affairs officer is commonly referred to as the pipeline or training 
pipeline.  Once the training pipeline is complete, the officer then becomes part of the 
Civil Affairs branch.  A very similar process holds true for Non-Commissioned officers 
as well. 
The current training model for Active Duty Civil Affairs is the 44-week course at 
the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS), Fort Bragg 
consisting of five phases.  The course's design formalized the training pipeline to meet 
new branch requirements vice the old functional area needs seen prior to the branch 
standing up in October 2006.  Prior to this, the pipeline was more ad hoc consisting of 
three separate portions: Civil Affairs Qualification Course, Regional Studies and 
language training.  If an individual had prior training in any of these three areas, that 
individual was not required to go through that portion of the training.  Now the pipeline 
must be completed in its entirety for an individual to be considered fully trained. 
The requirements for the new training pipeline arose from the needs inherent with 
standing up an entirely new career field within the Active Forces.  Since Civil Affairs 
was a functional area only for officers, there had been no formalized training for NCOs in 
conjunction with officer training.  Previously this had not been an issue as there was no 
Active Career field within Civil Affairs for NCOs and all NCOs serving within Civil 
Affairs were Special Forces qualified who had already been through language training, 
regional training and had operational experience within their assigned areas of operation.  
With the stand up of the Civil Affairs branch and increased demand for Special Forces, 
this would no longer be the case and NCOs would require training equal to the Civil 
Affairs officers.   
This pipeline, described below, was designed to make the transition from a 
Functional Area to a Branch.  Officers and NCOs trained together, only separating during 
Phase 2 briefly to receive individual skills necessary for their different roles.  Under this 
pipeline, each receives language training, regional training, and the skill sets necessary to 
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succeed as either a Civil Affairs Team Leader or NCO at the tactical level.  The stated 
goal of this training is to produce an adaptive leader or operator, culturally aware, and 
regionally oriented with foreign language capability (Mundell, 2007).   
   
                           
Figure 1.   Training pipeline incorporated in 2008 (Mundell, 2007) 
This lengthy process, from selection to completion of all training, has 
implications in terms of manning.  Unlike the Army’s basic branches, Civil Affairs does 
not produce a large number of personnel each year, nor can they be trained in a relatively 
short time as will be seen in the following chapter.  This means that any sizable increase 
in Civil Affairs personnel must consider these factors, if it is to be successful.  While the 
issue of manning a new unit is important, understanding the environment or future 
environment needs consideration as well.  Each environment places different demands on 
Civil Affairs and on active and reserve Civil Affairs components.  Any operational 
placement of Civil Affairs units needs to incorporate the career field’s ability to provide 
support in either small-scale or major force deployments within conventional or irregular 
situations. 
In the current environment, the United States is involved in two protracted 
conflicts fighting irregular non-state actors.  The future or emerging threat environment, 
however, is not so well defined.  All agree the future will bring more conflict but no one 
can determine with any amount of certainty what kind of conflict will present itself.  
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According to the Joint Operating Environment 2008, “Challenges and Implications for 
the Future Joint Force” there are two major scenarios facing the United States: 1) a major 
war with another state or alliance of states, and 2)   the failure to understand and engage 
the irregular fight currently taking place (United States Joint Forces Command, 2008).  
This however, bases all irregular fights on the Iraq/Afghanistan template and does not 
account for smaller scale, preventative actions like the Philippines and Colombia.   
These actions within countries like the Philippines and Colombia also fall under 
irregular warfare (IW), but on a much smaller scale.  Based on this irregular fights have 
two classifications models, small-scale (Philippines and Colombia) and large-scale (Iraq 
and Afghanistan).  The fact that large scale can mean both state on state and state on non-
state (irregular) is taken for a given.  Large-scale state on state and large-scale irregular 
fights will be treated as the same within this thesis as either would require large troop 
movements in order to accomplish mission goals.  Further, small scale implies assistance 
to a friendly or allied state in instances outside of invasion/occupation by American 
forces.  This is due to concerns of legitimacy and sovereignty within the affected country.  
So, which is the most likely in the emerging environment, the large-scale as currently 
seen in Iraq or Afghanistan, a major state-on-state action, or the small-scale as seen in the 
Philippines and Colombia? 
Currently, the U.S. has no peer opponent, although China’s sphere of influence is 
rising. However, some feel China’s greatest threat is in the possibility of its implosion 
(David, 2008, p. 116).  Having no peer opponent does not negate the possibility of a state 
on state conflict, of course.  North Korea or Iran could potentially force future U.S. 
action.  However, what makes state on state conflict and the large-scale irregular fight 
less likely are the current large-scale irregular conflicts taking place in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.   
Both Iraq and Afghanistan began as state on state actions, initiated by the United 
States that later devolved into engagements with non-state actors.  The first factor 
limiting the number of future large-scale engagements is cost: to date, according to the 
National Priorities Project, the cost of both the Iraq and Afghanistan wars is 
$922,000,000,000 and rising daily.  The human toll should not appear as a just number, 
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due to the rippling effect it has on the services and local communities, and it 
unfortunately rises each day too.  The second factor is political will.  After nine long 
years at war, polls are beginning to show the will of the American people is starting to 
falter.  Accordingly, it is highly likely that another large-scale deployment of troops will 
bring fierce resistance unless the United States is directly threatened.  Lastly, the U.S. 
military forces must reset.  With military resources and personnel worn down by the 
current operational tempo, another large-scale event on the heels of the current conflicts 
could cause damage to the U.S. military in terms of equipment and personnel readiness.  
Recently, the Army has begun targeting Captains for incentive bonuses to stem the 
increasing numbers of officers leaving the military due to repeated deployments 
(Bowman, 2007).  These same factors would hold true for any large-scale irregular threat 
similar to Iraq or Afghanistan.   
The average period between major conflicts for the United States is 
approximately 10–15 years, and that provides a planning norm to allow for the factors 
listed above to regenerate and renew themselves.  Consequently, small-scale preventative 
actions would appear the most likely events over the next 10–15 years and will be used as 
such for the remainder of this study.  Recognizing the possibility of two distinct 
environments in future operations, the Army in January 2009 sought to produce guidance 
for preparing force packages to deal with both possible events.  
The Army produced a plan to deal with this future environment in the January 
2009 Department of Defense Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report.  This 
report gives insight as to how the Army will carry out future deployment actions.  It 
stated:  
The SOF and GPF force mix for conducting future operations will largely 
depend on the risk and character of the operational environment, not 
simply by the task at hand.  For example, when operational environments 
dictate that the joint force presence remains unobtrusive, SOF will play a 
leading role.  General Purpose Forces will continue to play a leading role 
in operational environments where a large-scale presence is warranted to 
provide security to a population (p. 12).   
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By the explanation of the plan, it would appear that any deployment that would 
seem obtrusive is large-scale.  This may vary from country to country and places 
limitations on the forces inserted.  Since these are sovereign nations, outside of invasion 
the affected country’s wishes must be taken into consideration.  As shown in Appendix 
B, the Philippines considered anything above two hundred obtrusive.  Due to possible 
host country constraints on the size of force packages, deploying elements will need a 
wide range of skills in order to be effective.  
The delineation between a SOF environment and a GPF environment within the 
Department of Defense Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report affects 
predictions of operational tempo.  By indicating this split, the Army is in fact determining 
under what circumstances either force, SOF or GPF can expect the most utility and 
therefore be the most effective.  Accordingly, due to the likely threat environment, as 
defined in this thesis, the conventional forces can expect a decrease in their operational 
tempo.  However, simply because the indicators and rationale point to one particular 
direction in regards to the emerging or future environment does not make it so.  History is 
full of surprises and due to that, the structure created for the Civil Affairs force needs the 
flexibility to succeed in the most likely environment (small-scale) and the anomalous 




III. CURRENT ARMY PLAN (“DUAL HEADQUARTERS”) 
History records few instances where a majority of the population 
welcomes an occupying army. — Ivan Muscicant, Banana Wars, p. 109 
 
The U.S. Army is currently seeking to array its forces to best deal with the present 
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as potential conflicts to come.  In order to 
accomplish this task the Army intends to split the Active Civil Affairs headquarters 
element.  As previously stated, all Active Civil Affairs is under U.S. Army Special 
Operations Command.  The change would require creation of a new Civil Affairs brigade 
under the operational control of U.S. Army Forces Command.  Therefore, instead of all 
Active Civil Affairs under one Major Area Command, the Active Civil Affairs forces 
would find themselves split between two separate commands.   
By having this new Civil Affairs brigade under U.S. Forces Command, the Army 
will attempt to address the need for additional Civil Affairs forces to support Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  In a recent report to Congress on Civil Affairs dated April 29, 2009, the 
document states, “This increase will meet current demand for Civil Affairs personnel in 
Iraq and Afghanistan within the Secretary of Defense’s prescribed dwell ratios by 2013.”  
However, most agree the vast majority of U.S. forces will be out of Iraq by 2012.  There 
is currently a move within the Iraqi government for a vote to withdraw American forces 
by the end of 2011.  For Afghanistan, public opinion after eight years of conflict with 
little or no gains is now beginning to show signs of strain.  Without a dramatic change in 
direction, this trend will continue and the United States will seek to scale back its 
involvement.  In November 2009, the military was awaiting a decision regarding an 
increase in force levels in Afghanistan in order to regain the initiative against the Taliban.  
Should this increase in U. S. forces take place in the short-term, there will still be a 
reduction of U.S. forces there in the mid- to long-term, as there has been in Iraq.  This 
anticipated reduction of conventional forces is in contrast to the operations of SOF 
personnel who are expected to continue to conduct their mission at their current level of 
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unit commitment in both Iraq and Afghanistan (Cleveland, 2009).  In direct relation to 
this decrease of conventional forces deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan is the stand up time 
of the new brigade.  By 2011, only six new Civil Affairs Companies will be ready, 
providing there are no personnel or equipment issues (95th Civil Affairs Brigade, 2009).  
In 2012, eighteen companies will be active, but due to the reasons stated above, it is 
debatable the impact these elements will have within Iraq or Afghanistan. 
In addition to preparing forces for deployments that might not take place; the new 
alignment will also cause problems in the training pipeline.  By placing the new Civil 
Affairs brigade in support of GPF, the training pipeline must also conform to meet this 
new requirement.  This change may lead to possible training modifications, and give 
those responsible for training Civil Affairs personnel three viable options;  1) two entirely 
different training tracks, 2) the same training for both GPF and SOF Civil Affairs, or 3) a 
modified track encompassing parts of the current training pipeline, but not all.     
Option 1 creates two entirely different training tracks, one training pipeline for 
Civil Affairs personnel in support of GPF and one training pipeline for Civil Affairs 
personnel in support of SOF.  This course of action would be extremely problematic.  In 
order to accomplish this task the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and 
School (SWCS) would have to double the number of Civil Affairs trainers, and build 
additional physical structures to accommodate the new training program.  SWCS is 
already straining to meet current demand, and it is doubtful the branch could fill the new 
requirements for cadre.  Additionally this would cause a need for the creation of new 
curriculum in order to prepare the GPF Civil Affairs for their role and creation of a 
process to determine those Civil Affairs personnel who would support GPF and those that 
would support SOF.   
Option 2 sets the same training for both GPF and SOF Civil Affairs.  This would 
be much easier to accommodate by both the branch and SWCS, as it only requiring an 
increase in cadre and physical structures for training, but it too brings problems.  Under 
this model, nothing would change in the pipeline and all would graduate with the same 
skills sets, but not all would have the opportunity to utilize them.  Those selected for 
assignment to a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) would see their language and cultural skills 
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wasted unless their assigned unit actually deployed to their region of expertise.  The 
branch could attempt to circumvent this by having personnel float back and forth between 
GPF and SOF but the results would be the same, an atrophy of skills.   
This problem of regional and language skills loss is already significant as Civil 
Affairs personnel continue to deploy to regions outside of their areas due to the shortage 
of trained personnel.  This option would accelerate the process and exacerbate the 
problem.  For example, when the 97th Civil Affairs Battalion stood up there were very 
few present for the ceremony; most of the 97th was deployed to Afghanistan.  The 97th is 
the Pacific Command oriented battalion.  Shortly after the 97th Civil Affairs Teams 
returned from Afghanistan, they redeployed to Iraq.  Members of the 98th Civil Affairs 
Battalion have already deployed to Iraq and the Philippines and are supporting operations 
in Africa.  The 98th is the Southern Command oriented battalion. 
Option 3 a modified track encompassing parts of the current training pipeline but 
not all, and is a course of action the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center 
and School and Civil Affairs Branch could also more easily perform but this would also 
create problems in the long term.  Under this option, the regional and language aspects of 
the training would face elimination for the GPF Civil Affairs soldiers.  However, part of 
what makes the branch unique is its cultural knowledge and language skills; under this 
model, these skills would be lost for the GPF Civil Affairs officers and NCOs.  Cultural 
skills and language would not serve a BCT well, due to the lack of regional alignment 
within the conventional forces.  It would simply be unreasonable to expect the Civil 
Affairs personnel in a BCT to be experts in all societies.  The fact is Civil Affairs 
personnel are supposed to be cultural experts of their region and masters of the human 
terrain, but in this scenario they would simply be a “jack of all trades and a master of 
none.”  This option would also call for some type of delineation process to occur 
separating future SOF and GPF Civil Affairs prior to training. 
At the tactical level relationships with the host nation and its population can be 
destroyed and legitimacy ruined by a lack of knowledge of the culture.  Not to give Civil 
Affairs teams this knowledge or to continue to send them to areas outside of their training 
increases the likelihood of problems and decreases their overall utility in a given 
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situation.  It is essential to structure Civil Affairs assets properly for the missions they are 
best suited for and trained to accomplish.  Training, however, is not the only concern for 
this new brigade, manning and resourcing within two separate commands will also bring 
issues.  For the purposes of this thesis, it will be assumed that SWCS will choose the 
second option in an attempt to retain necessary branch skills while causing the least 
amount of disruption to the Civil Affairs training pipeline. 
 
 
Figure 2.   Proposed Growth SOF and GPF (95th Civil Affairs Brigade, 2009) 
Splitting the headquarters elements of this new Civil Affairs brigade outside of 
USASOC produces two entities from different commands competing for identical 
resources in a time of war, with limited manpower and equipment pools.  While the 
Army is growing overall, not all personnel in the Army are eligible for Civil Affairs 
assignments.  These personnel must meet specific criteria in terms of intelligence, 
aptitude, physical ability, and performance before they are selected to attend Civil Affairs 
training.  This much smaller pool must then be shared between two commands.   
According to a brief produced by the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade, approved growth 
for the unit in FY 2010 calls for an additional four Civil Affairs Companies consisting of 
128 personnel, during that same time the GPF Brigade requires a brigade headquarters 
(106 personnel), one battalion headquarters (73 personnel) and six Civil Affairs 
Companies consisting of 192 personnel.  In FY 2011, this competition becomes more 
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pronounced as the growth for 95th Civil Affairs Brigade is approved for one battalion 
headquarters (73 personnel) and five Civil Affairs Companies consisting of 160 
personnel.  In that same year, the GPF Brigade is approved to grow two battalion 
headquarters (146 personnel) and 12 Civil Affairs Companies consisting of 384 
personnel.  The numbers represented here are for all Military Occupational Specialties 
(MOS), both officer and enlisted are represented within the growth of both units.  These 
numbers include both Civil Affairs personnel and lower density skills such as intelligence 
and signal.  As seen, there is competition for resources in FY10 for company assets.  This 
competition expands in FY11 including not only company level, but battalion level assets 
as well.   
In respect to Civil Affairs personnel, the GPF brigade will require at the company 
level 168 personnel in FY10 (95th Civil Affairs Brigade, 2009).  In FY11 and FY12, the 
GPF brigade will require 336 for each year at the company level (95th Civil Affairs 
Brigade, 2009).  At the same time, the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade will require 112 Civil 
Affairs personnel at the company level for FY10 and 140 for FY11 (95th Civil Affairs 
Brigade, 2009).  These are formidable numbers to obtain, especially when one considers 
it takes 6 to 10 ½ months to train a Civil Affairs NCO, depending on language training.  
An officer can take up to 19 months to train due to the Captain’s Career Course and 
Airborne training which must be completed prior to entering the Civil Affairs training 
pipeline.  The time it takes to produce qualified personnel is directly tied to the ability to 
staff these two units within the prescribed timeframes, especially under different 
command structures.  This means that many would have to be in the training pipeline 
now in order to meet the proposed effective date, which is 16 Oct 2010 (95th Civil 
Affairs Brigade, 2009).  This becomes more problematic when one considers the number 
of personnel in the training pipeline can fluctuate depending on availability of personnel 
to attend training.  Current Human Resources Command guidelines are such that a 
deployed individual cannot be removed from his or her position for training unless the 
affected command approves of the loss.  This is to prevent an adverse affect on a unit’s 
mission capabilities while engaged in combat operations.  For training projections, 
however, it means no two classes are ever the same in number of personnel.  Some are 
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filled to capacity; others have barely enough to be considered a class.  This has been a 
recurring constraint within training pipeline projections and will continue until the 
operational tempo subsides.  Training and manning a unit is the precursor for operational 
usage and operational capacity.  Operational capacity, which is the new Civil Affairs 
unit’s ability to function within its environment, must also be addressed along with 
personnel and training issues. 
Before looking at the least likely scenario, a model of usage must first be 
constructed, as none presently exists outside of Iraq or Afghanistan.  The Horn of Africa 
could be cited, but the scale is not sufficient to warrant the restructuring of an entire 
branch to support operations in the Horn so the model must incorporate something larger.  
General George Casey, Army Chief of Staff, has stated he sees approximately ten 
brigades deployed annually in the coming years (“Army Chief,” 2009).  These ten 
brigades deployed, depicted below will be referred to as the “10-Forward” Model and 
will act as the basis for comparison. 
 
Figure 3.   GPF “10-Forward” Model with current MTOE 
The unit patches represent conceptual selections of BCTs as an example.  As per 
p. 1–6 of FM 3-05.40 Civil Affairs Operations, one Civil Affairs company can support 
one BCT; these supporting companies are represented directly below the unit.  The Civil 
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Affairs companies and their battalion headquarters elements not deploying in this 
scenario are represented in the lower right.  If all BCTs are deploying to one area regional 
alignment for the new Civil Affairs brigade is disrupted.  If five BCTs are going to one 
area of operation and five to another as defined by the Combatant Commands, regional 
alignment can be maintained for one rotation (current conventional rotations are from 12–
15 months), but subsequent rotations will not have this aligned support.  With only five 
companies per area of operations, there simply will not be any regionally aligned 
elements left within the new brigade to provide support.  This will force the new brigade 
to begin sending in forces that usually operate in other areas of operation.  The longer 
these rotations occur, the more damage inflicted upon the new brigade’s regional and 
language skills.  Subsequent representations of this model are based on the same 
principles described here.  As will be discussed later the probability of the BCTs 
deploying to separate areas individually is low.  To deploy alone would imply an attempt 
to make the operation unobtrusive, which by Army guidance necessitates SOF. 
By looking at the GPF “10-Forward” model, it is clear that with as little as five 
BCTs deployed, regional orientation within the Civil Affairs brigade is lost if the action 
takes more than one rotation in the area of operation to resolve.  As seen below, even 
factoring in the proposed Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Modified Table of Organization 
and Equipment (MTOE) request for additional personnel and structure for the 95th Civil 
Affairs Brigade would not allow for the maintenance of regional alignment, nor would it 
allow for habitual support by the new Civil Affairs brigade.  This QDR request asks for 
an additional company per battalion and an additional Civil Affairs Team per company 
(95th Civil Affairs Brigade, 2009).  As discussed, this problem of regional alignment is 
already present within the career field and under the “Dual Headquarters” will get worse.  
Under the “Dual Headquarters” alignment, the new Civil Affairs forces can expect use in 
a manner that most certainly will eliminate their regional and cultural skills.  This 
degradation of skills will cause a loss of effectiveness in the long term for Civil Affairs 
forces.         
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Figure 4.   GPF “10-Forward” Model with QDR MTOE Request 
Even at full operational strength, this new Civil Affairs brigade can only support 
30 out of 71 total BCTs.  This makes habitual support to the conventional units 
impossible under any circumstances.  Further, there is not enough depth to allow the 
Active Civil Affairs personnel to maintain the skills necessary within the career field.  
This is due the new Civil Affairs brigade’s lack of ability to maintain regional alignment 
leading to further loss of regional and language skills.  Other constraints make the 
proposed Army plan fail for the likely environment scenario as well.  
This study assumes that most readers are extremely familiar with the large-scale 
environment given the nightly news coverage, but the small-scale environment is 
decidedly different.  These small actions occur much more frequently than their 
counterpart, but go largely unnoticed by the American public and so therefore require a 
more in-depth description.  They often involve counterinsurgency, but due to sovereignty 
and legitimacy issues, necessitate a less robust force package. 
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Legitimacy is primarily a social practice dealing with the relationship of the ruled 
vice the rulers.2  Legitimacy is “multifaceted, highly contingent, and a dynamic feature of 
government; hence its cultivation must be unending” (Alagappa, 1995, p. 1).  Within the 
aspects of the “right to rule” are four key elements. 
The first of these key elements for political legitimacy is shared norms and values.  
These speak to the belief system or ideologies inherent within a society (Alagappa, 1995, 
p. 15).  Shared norms and values lead to social bonds, which in turn lead to an agreement 
on which the rulers must adhere to in order to remain in power.  In a diverse society the 
more the dominant group appears to represent the overall interests of the people the more 
it will perceived as legitimate.  Conversely, when challenges of an ideological nature 
appear this can be destabilizing especially if these group or groups begin to gain in size 
and support (Alagappa, 1995, p. 18). 
Secondly, the rulers or government within a given country must conform to 
established rules within the society (Alagappa, 1995, p. 21).  The military will operate in 
many areas where the government or authority structures operate along traditional lines 
regardless of the facades erected to facilitate the appearance of a modern government.  
Afghanistan provides an excellent present day example of this.  In these instances, the 
formal system may not have nearly the influence necessary for legitimacy, instead 
traditional ties and practices remain.  When this occurs, performance becomes essential.  
Afghanistan, again, provides the example.  Here the government is trying to break the 
traditional systems but its performance thus far has not allowed it to do so effectively.   
Performance of the government falls directly under what Alagappa cites as the 
third key to legitimacy, which is the proper use of power.  This comes in the forms of the 
government operating within the law or accepted rules and performance.  A government 
gains legitimacy if the government's power is attempting to act on the people’s behalf.  
However, when the government's use or perceived use is for personal gain at the expense 
of the people authority begins to fall away.  Many governments of the world are seen in 
                                                 
2 Muthiah Alagappa, author of Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority 
gives a very detailed explanation and analysis of legitimacy particularly regarding meaning and nature.  
Understanding legitimacy is key to understanding the intricacies of small-scale operations. 
 26
this light, most notably in Africa.  Not unlike adhering to accepted rules, performance can 
also lend itself to legitimacy and poor performance can do just the opposite (Alagappa, 
1995, p. 22). 
Consent of the governed is the fourth element of legitimacy and this is given 
solely by the people.  Without consent, there is no authority with the government as a 
whole.  Alagappa also states that mere participation in elections in and of itself does not 
alone grant consent.  This participation must be in tandem with belief in the principles 
and participation within the process and procedures of the system in place (Alagappa, 
1995, p. 23).  Consent is considered given if orders from the government or laws are 
actively obeyed.  This means that while an individual may not agree with the law, they 
conform accordingly. 
Examining aspects of legitimacy brings to light many of the issues governments 
face within the emerging environment.  The types of societies within this environment are 
experiencing problems in one or more of the four key elements of legitimacy.  In these 
instances, the creation of force packages tailored to suit not only the needs of the 
governments, but also the expectations of the people are required.  While “a large-scale 
presence is warranted to provide security to a population,” as outlined by the 2009 
Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report it may not be accepted by the society at 
large.  A large-scale deployment of GPF forces could essentially peel away any further 
aspects of legitimacy in the eyes of the people, as the government must now rely on 
outside actors to provide what a solid government would on a natural basis.  Our goal in 
these cases should always be to enhance what is already there.  Even small-scale 
deployments can have an effect on legitimacy, especially if these forces are unfamiliar 
with the area and its customs.  By not having the knowledge of social norms the force can 
delegitimize itself and the government it is trying to aid.  
The host nation in a conflict or shaping operation must be willing to accept U.S. 
support.  More importantly, the insurgents cannot use this U.S. support to further 
delegitimize the government in power (Maxwell, 2008).  These instances of deployment 
within the emerging threat environment will involve allies or areas of U.S. national 
interests where internal conflict has destabilized a partner nation necessitating American 
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military intervention (David, 2008, p. 18-20).  The sheer size of the BCT complement 
makes the likelihood of a BCT deployment improbable.  The Philippines was prepared to 
reject more than 200 U.S. personnel.  AFRICOM comprised of approximately 1,300 
personnel cannot find a home in Africa because of the belief it militarizes policy towards 
the continent (Volman, 2008).  A BCT has approximately 3000-3500 soldiers and is 
simply not structured or trained to the degree of Special Operations forces to allow them to 
deploy a small element and achieve the same results.  Consequently, when a BCT deploys 
usually the whole structure goes with it.  Moreover, since perception can be a powerful 
force, the mere possibility of our forces being seen as occupiers, in either size or 
structure, must be avoided at all costs.  Further, being perceived as unwilling to adhere to 
local customs is equally as damaging.   
In the most likely operational scenario of a friendly or allied country requiring 
assistance to deal with an insurgent threat, this “Dual Headquarters” configuration fails.  
Further, the placement of this new brigade under U.S. Forces Command will give over 
80% of the Civil Affairs force to an element of the Army that is operating in less than 
20% of the globe (United States Special Operations Command, 2009).  Active Civil 
Affairs skills are not honed at the Joint Readiness Training Center or National Training 
Center.  True tactical skill in the Active career field only comes through operating within 
the target culture or area.  This is due to their need to work in close proximity to the 
population, coupled with their limited generalist skill sets.  Brigade Combat Teams, 
outside of invasion/occupation will likely not give this opportunity to Civil Affairs 
forces.  The J33 United States Special Operations Command estimates that if this new 
brigade falls under U.S. Forces Command, conventional Civil Affairs will have more 
Civil Affairs forces at their disposal than can be properly utilized in the mid- to long-
term.  This produces limited gains with an uncertain application for future usage. 
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IV. ALTERNATIVE TO PROPOSED ARMY CHANGE  
(“SINGLE HEADQUARTERS”) 
Force has no place where there is need of skill.  
—Herodotus, The Histories of Herodotus 
Greek historian & traveler (484 BC - 430 BC) 
Under the single and unitary Headquarters of U.S. Army Special Operations 
Command (USASOC), the Army can create both depth, within Civil Affairs by assigning 
units where they are most needed, and flexibility for application.  As shown below, under 
this “Single Headquarters” U.S. Army Special Operations Command configuration, there 
will now be two battalions culturally and linguistically aligned for every Area of 
Operations, instead of just one.  While this configuration cannot guarantee regional 
alignment, it does give additional depth not found in the “Dual Headquarters” 
configuration.  This depth comes from having more Civil Affairs personnel and units 
concentrated in one command.  In turn, this depth will allow for more flexibility in terms 
of support, meaning the Army will have a wider array of options with which to utilize 
this force.  Historically, this paradigm has always held USASOC as the force provider for 
conventional operations, and the “Single Headquarters” configuration is in keeping with 
that paradigm.  By having this additional depth and flexibility, USASOC can continue to 
accomplish this mission and its own.  To date, units within FORSCOM have not fallen 
under the operational control of USASOC.  In Afghanistan, as soon as conventional 
forces arrived, the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force immediately fell under 
the operational command of conventional forces.  This means that any Civil Affairs 




Figure 5.   SOF “10-Forward” Model with current MTOE 
The “Single Headquarters” SOF configuration is noticably different from the 
“Dual Headquarters” Option due to the number of Civil Affairs units available for 
operations.  The scenario depicted in the previous chapter and the earlier representations 
still exist, however, when the two battalions deploy, there are eight left in reserve. Two of 
these belong to the same regional alignment as the battalions deploying with conventional 
forces.  These “stay behind” forces could then be utilized by USASOC. 
Despite their recent increase in size, the Active Civil Affairs are still only able to 
meet less than half of the USASOC mission requirements due to a shortfall of forces 
(Hartzel, 2008).  Even with the approved growth, Active Civil Affairs will not meet the 
needs of the Special Operations Community (United States Special Operations 
Command, 2009).  In fact, these forces will not even be able to meet a 1:1 dwell ratio, 
based on current projections.  A 1:1 dwell means that for every year deployed the unit or 
team should receive one year at home.  Unfortunately, the mission demand is such that 
this will not likely happen for Civil Affairs personnel operating within USASOC.  As 
stated, this is even with the projected growth currently taking place.  Meanwhile, outside 
of Iraq and Afghanistan, Civil Affairs units would have an uncertain future mission under 
U.S. Army Forces Command. 
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The “Single Headquarters” SOF alternative will also increase both the utility of 
the Civil Affairs Team (CAT) and Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA).  
According to USASOC, there are approximately 330 ODAs that could benefit from the 
support of a CAT.  The Commander’s In-extremist Force (CIF) companies or Direct 
Action teams are eliminated from this equation, as they would not necessarily benefit 
from the use of a CAT.  As previously stated, the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade is requesting 
under the upcoming Quadrennial Defense Roles and Missions Review to expand to six 
companies per battalion and six CATs per company.  If this growth is approved that will 




Figure 6.   SOF “10-Forward” Model with QDR MTOE Request 
This new brigade is to have the same Modified Table of Organization and 
Equipment (MTOE) as the 95th and if that includes the most recent growth requested, 
filling both to capacity, the Army would have a one for one match CAT to ODA.  This 
also leaves an additional 30 CATs to fill Civil Military Support Elements requirements 
around the world.  This would allow a continual, habitual relationship to develop between 
every ODA and CAT.  It allows the ODA to focus on a smaller mission set and allows for 
easy delineation between lethal and non-lethal operations.  In short it allows 
interoperability to become a given thereby increasing the overall utility of each and 
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ultimately allowing each team to become more effective tools in their environments.  
However, having this new Civil Affairs brigade under the command of USASOC does 
not mean the conventional forces cannot utilize them. 
When only the 96th CA Battalion was extant, one team within its Echo Company 
was always prepared to support the Rapid Deployment element of the 82nd Airborne 
Division.  This type of support could again be established, only on a wider scale.  Under 
this proposal, if needed, any non-deployed Civil Affairs company within either brigade 
would be prepared to support any deploying conventional unit.  This will provide a 
“bridging force” or entry unit in order to make initial assessments, and provide necessary 
Civil Affairs support until such time security is established, allowing a transition to 
Reserve Civil Affairs forces.  This will also reduce the dwell time issues of the Reserve 
Civil Affairs component.3  Dwell time refers to the prescribed inactive time a Reserve 
unit must have between deployments or any other instance that would cause activation of 
the unit.  As needed, the supporting Civil Affairs elements could rotate in their GPF 
support, supporting GPF and SOF deploying into assigned areas of operation, cutting 
down on language and regional skill loss.  Additionally, having two brigades for each 
combatant command increases the odds the support received will be from the correct 
region.  As seen in the “10-Forward” Model slides, there is no way to achieve this under 
the “Dual Headquarters” model.  In short, maintenance of regional orientation is much 
more likely under the “Single Headquarters” SOF configuration.  The situation described 
here will be unlike the surge in Iraq when Active Civil Affairs Teams, regardless of 
regional specialty, were tasked to provide needed support to GPF.    
By having a ready-made “bridging force” within the Active Civil Affairs, units to 
be used as needed for each rotation the Reserve Civil Affairs forces can begin to focus on 
their functional specialties.  As outlined in Appendix A, over the last eight years, there 
has been a definite shift in the Reserves both doctrinally and operationally away from the 
functional skills to general skills.  Once the drawdown begins in the current large-scale 
                                                 
3 Current dwell ratios are 1:2 for Active Civil Affairs forces and 1:5 for Reserve Civil Affairs forces.  
However, neither the Active nor the Reserve Civil Affairs components have met these guidelines.  The 
Reserve Civil Affairs Component’s current dwell ratio is 1:2.2 while the Active Civil Affairs Component’s 
dwell ratio is 1:.8.   
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conflicts and the strain lightens on both the Reserve Civil Affairs forces and the 
conventional forces this new Active Civil Affairs brigade will be positioned to provide 
support for USASOC.  This will provide USASOC with the forces needed to fill their 
validated future mission shortfall.  Additionally, in the long term it will allow for the 
structures and measures to be instituted, which in turn will lead to habitual support for the 
conventional forces by the Reserve Civil Affairs component.  As will be shown later, 
only the Reserves have the capacity to provide habitual relationships to conventional 
BCTs.   
By aligning the Reserves to the Brigade Combat Teams, the Active Civil Affairs 
component can remove its personnel from these units at the Brigade level.  This will free 
up needed individuals to fill strategic planning and liaison positions currently lacking 
within the Active force.  In turn, the BCTs receive personnel that can link them with their 
actual supporting unit.  If this is not done this strategic capacity may not emerge until 
after the growth is complete, due to the present deficits within the Active Civil Affairs 
component.  Additionally, actual internal support to the BCTs may drop as personnel fill 
needed positions within both brigades.  Explanation of this issue and course of action 
requires further discussion, which is provided in the following chapter. 
By planning for the most likely scenario in the emerging environment, the Army 
can produce a force attuned to the environment with the depth to enable the support to be 
regionally aligned to the area of operations and the flexibility to support SOF, but able to 
adapt if conventional forces are required.  In the previous chapter, legitimacy and 
sovereignty concerns within the most likely environment were discussed, now the skills 
required to succeed will be examined.  Early intervention is crucial to success in this 
arena of counterinsurgency.  An emerging insurgency is much more easily defeated than 
one more mature (Warner, 2007, p. 75).  In most cases, the insurgents are formulating 
their cause, gathering support and learning through trial and error adequate guerrilla 
tactics (Warner, 2007, p. 75).  After identifying the threat, a decision needs to be made 
concerning the force package required.  This force package should be aligned both 
regionally and linguistically with the area of operation. 
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Realizing that no two insurgencies will ever be completely the same, due to the 
societies in which they reside, the force package should have the requisite skills to 
operate within that specific area.  However, since the causes of insurgency are common, 
this force must also be adept at utilizing the practices best suited to combat the root 
issues.  To determine which forces have the skills in this arena “best practices” in an 
insurgent conflict require examination.  By utilizing a comparative edge analysis it can 
then be determined what forces best fit the needed mold.   
Comparative edge analysis is accomplished by looking at the needed action and 
then making a determination as to the element best suited to perform the task based off 
attributes inherent within the force.  The force or element that contains the most attributes 
in regards to the action therefore has the comparative edge.  The actions listed below 
from RAND will be examined and discussed to show why the SOF element is best suited 
for that role.  This is not to say others cannot accomplish the action, but in all likelihood 
will not accomplish it as quickly or efficiently.  
A RAND Counterinsurgency Study identifies these as the following: 
ACTION FORCE 
Adaptability SOF 
Military and Civilian Agencies Working 
Together 
CA 
Civic and Humanitarian Actions CA 
Culturally Appropriate PSYOP 
Campaign 
PSYOP 
Use of Indigenous Forces SF 
Intelligence SOF 
Troops in Close Proximity to Population SOF 
Adequate Police Force SF 
Enhanced Cultural and Language Skills SOF 
Political Option Open to Insurgents HOST NATION 
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Taking the RAND listing into account SOF forces most closely align to the needs 
of a micro-insurgent environment.  Since SOF usually operates in an autonomous manner, 
they have the ability to adapt to situations as needed.  Conventional forces tend to take 
longer to adapt than SOF as seen in Iraq and Afghanistan, and this period for adaptation 
comes with a high price in losses to American military personnel and overall cost.  Iraq 
devolved into insurgency soon after major combat operations ceased; it was not until 
2007 that conventional forces began adjusting their operational tactics.  In Afghanistan, 
this adaptation is still taking place.  Each situation will provide some lessons learned and 
will be beneficial others will not causing additional adaptation in each new area visited.  
These practices will be helpful but only to the degree in how they are applied.  In other 
words, these practices must conform to the targeted society, to do that the forces need to 
be regionally and culturally aware. 
Civil Affairs personnel routinely act as a liaison between military and civilian 
agencies and carries out civic and humanitarian actions.  Psychological Operations Forces 
will conduct a culturally appropriate PSYOP campaign since they like all SOF all are 
language trained with regional orientation.  Use of indigenous forces and a hands-off 
approach to combat operations is the epitome of the Special Forces mission and no other 
element within the U.S. military is as proficient at the mission.  They have demonstrated 
this across the globe, most recently in the Philippines.  Enhanced language and cultural 
skills can build trust faster and lead to increased cooperation on the part of the population 
(Warner, 2007, p. 73).  Both are inherent qualities within all SOF: Civil Affairs, 
Psychological Operations, and Special Forces members.  
This increased trust and cooperation between SOF and the population allows 
these forces to base in close proximity to the population, unlike their conventional 
counterparts who continue to base large portions of their forces on expansive forward 
operating bases.  These SOF units also come with their own intelligence apparatus and 
are familiar with operating in conjunction with embassies and country teams.  While 
conventional forces also have their own intelligence apparatus utilizing these components 
in conjunction with country teams and embassies, would be something new and again 
would require an adaptation period. 
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Ensuring an adequate police force is something that either Special Forces or a 
Military Police (MP) Company could accomplish.  Each has the requisite skill to 
facilitate this, but the advantage given the situation must go to Special Forces.  Special 
Forces will have the in-country experience to draw from, something the MPs will not 
have at their disposal.  This is not a police force in the traditional sense, but more of a 
constabulary one based on local needs.  Field Manual 3-05.137 Army Special Operations 
Forces Foreign Internal Defense p. B3 describes the use of such a force.  A traditionally 
western notion of a police force would require something other than just MPs or Special 
Forces.  This would require Reserve Civil Affairs perhaps working in combination with 
MPs or Special Forces.   
Civil Affairs, Special Forces and Psychological Operations each provide an 
essential component in conducting COIN.  No one element can operate alone in an 
insurgent environment as effectively as it can with the other two.  Having Civil Affairs 
provides an element solely focused on the population, Psychological Operations directly 
attacks the will of the insurgency and promotes legitimacy of the government.  Special 
Forces in turn builds, trains and advises needed indigenous forces to establish more 
government control.  If any of the three is missing from the equation it forces the others 
to operate in areas outside of their expertise.  It is working in tandem that increases their 
overall utility.  With their regional and language skills, they are able accomplish these 
tasks at the lowest level.  
Special Operations Forces already have the skills to operate in their designated 
areas, and do not require any additional training.  Nor will they need time to adapt to the 
operational environment.  They are comfortable operating in politically sensitive areas, 
utilizing country teams and the embassy.  With the Theater Special Operations Command 
and the embassy engaged the goal is to insert these forces for early intervention.  
Tailoring the SOF force presents little problem, as all are components of 
counterinsurgency, but some instances may require more of one and possibly less of 
another.  More importantly, these forces, due to the small sizes in which they usually 
operate and the skills they bring, will not detract from the legitimacy or sovereignty of 
the host government simply by their presence. 
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Historically, during peacetime, SOF has always had a higher operational tempo 
then their GPF counterparts and there is nothing on the horizon to suggest a change to 
this.  When dealing with irregular threats it is essential to have the capability for a bottom 
up approach.  A bottom up approach must have personnel that can interact with the 
populace at the lowest levels to build rapport and capacity.  Due to their regional and 
language skills, Civil Affairs are among these forces.  A bottom up approach becomes 
more effective if done in a preemptive fashion.  In doing so relationships are formed and 
trust built before an internal crisis gains momentum (Rothstein, 2007).  Forces under SOF 
conducting their missions worldwide are already accomplishing this task.  Manning the 
force that will conduct these operations with adequate tools allows for a more effective 
and flexible military option. 
Instead of splitting Civil Affairs, the Army should be consolidating these units 
under one command.  This will not eliminate all issues but nor will it add to the list of 
problems.  By having all Civil Affairs under USASOC gives greater depth and flexibility 
to address the unexpected but more importantly brings the elements in line with the most 
likely future deployments.  These deployments will not look like Iraq and Afghanistan 
but instead will look more like the Philippines and Colombia.  These are small footprint 
and preventive using a combination of forces specifically trained for their role.  Since 
these operations involve a small amount of resources, the small footprint can be sustained 
over long periods of time, which is important when attempting to counter or destroy an 
established terrorist network or an insurgency (Feickert, 2005, p. 15, 16).   
Organizationally, the “Single Headquarters” SOF configuration allows central 
command and control of the new Civil Affairs forces to remain the same; there is no need 
to establish new C2.  Additionally, it would mitigate if not solve the shortfall of mission 
requirements within USASOC.  Placing the unit under the “Dual Headquarters” 
configuration simply transplants the same issues of regional and language skill loss 
present within the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade to another command without addressing the 
issues.  Additionally, under the “Dual Headquarters” configuration there is no well-
defined mission for the brigade outside of current operations, this is not the case under 
the “Single Headquarters” SOF configuration. 
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When conventional forces within Iraq and Afghanistan are reduced, in all 
likelihood, the requirements for USASOC will continue to increase if history is any 
indicator.  SOCOM future models also bear this out.  In the “Dual Headquarters” 
configuration having filled the critical short-term need these Civil Affairs forces could 
find themselves without missions, and with severe regional skills atrophy, meanwhile 
USASOC would still have its mission shortfall.  With both brigades under SOF, even if 
the additional personnel and structure requested by the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade within 
the upcoming QDR was denied, USASOC could still maintain regional alignment, 
although should they be needed the soldiers rotating in and out of Iraq and Afghanistan 
would only be at a 1:1 dwell. 
The placement of the new Civil Affairs brigade within Special Operations, while 
better overall than the “Dual Headquarters” configuration, does have several deficiencies.  
One issue is that conventional units will more than likely not be able to train with their 
aligned Reserve units prior to deployment in the near term.  However, once the 
operational tempo begins to decline, Reserve dwell issues will also erode making this 
much less of a problem.  This alignment combined with the Active Civil Affairs 
“bridging force” will give the conventional forces adequate capacity to conduct full 
spectrum operations.  The use of both Active and BCT aligned Reserve Civil Affairs will 
give the conventional forces both the low-end skills of the generalist for initial 
engagement and the high-end skills of the functional specialist to ensure the peace.   
The “Single Headquarters” SOF configuration will not solve the issues of 
expansion within the training base, but it will leave no question as to the structure of the 
training pipeline.  As shown in the following chapter, the shortfall of Civil Affairs 
trainers can be addressed through alternate measures.  Further, the “Single Headquarters” 
SOF configuration will not alleviate the personnel shortages issues also discussed later, 
but it will eliminate any internal competition for resources at the company, battalion and 
brigade level.  By allowing the unit to come from the same pool, so to speak, the two 
units can work in tandem with each other instead of directly against the mission readiness 
of its sister brigade.  In short, the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade would continue filling until 
units were ready to break off to the new brigade.  In addition to assisting the approaching 
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personnel problems, it would also alleviate many of the equipment issues that will come 
to the forefront.  This approach, used effectively throughout the current growth of the 
95th Civil Affairs Brigade is easily applied to this situation with no loss to mission only 
potential gain.   
In order to combat the personnel problems the 95th used a technique referred to as 
internal slicing.  For example within the 95th, the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion continued 
to fill internally until it began to go beyond its personnel authorizations.  When this 
occurred, the excess was then sliced off to create the 97th Civil Affairs Battalion.  In 
order to overcome equipment issues the equipment was “hot bunked” between teams.  As 
one team or company returned from deployment, their equipment was inventoried, and 
immediately signed over to another element preparing to deploy.  These solutions, 
unfortunately, are not available under the “Dual Headquarters” configuration due to the 
separation of the units.  As will be shown in the following chapter, Civil Affairs branch is 
already operating at a deficit of personnel; two competing units will amplify this and 
make it more pronounced. 
The “Single Headquarters” SOF configuration will also not give the conventional 
forces continued access to the regional and language skills inherent within the Active 
Civil Affairs.  Their “bridging force” will have this, but the Reserve follow-on forces will 
not.  While some language and regionally ability is within the Reserve Civil Affairs units, 
no recent training model has ever fully supported this (Mundell, 2007).  Due to the lack 
of functional skills within the Active forces, it is essential they have the ability to imbed 
at the local level.  Following on the gains by the Active forces the Reserves should not 
require these skills, and it should not adversely affect their mission.  Providing security is 
established, the skills brought by the Reserve Civil Affairs personnel should more than 
compensate for their lack of regional and language proficiency.   
While neither option is perfect, the “Single Headquarters” SOF configuration is 
markedly more flexible and comes closest to addressing the current and future needs of 
both the Civil Affairs branch and the Army.  Each option, however, fails in two areas of 
particular importance and those areas are habitual support to the conventional forces and 
the ability of the Active Civil Affairs to create a strategic presence. 
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V. DEFICIENCIES WITHIN EACH OPTION 
The Active Civil Affairs forces due to their size cannot solve the problem of 
habitual support to conventional units; the only solution for this is the restructuring of the 
Reserves.  In order to create consistent support within the conventional forces, the 
Reserve Civil Affairs units must be aligned to BCTs.  This was to have occurred after the 
split in 2006, but did not happen.  The conventional forces both need and deserve proper 
habitual support.  At no time should a BCT commander have to wonder where their Civil 
Affairs support originates from and what capabilities this Civil Affairs unit will have.  
Only the Reserve Civil Affairs has the capacity to provide this missing component.  
There are currently 71 Active and Guard BCTs.  An active duty brigade can only provide 
consistent support to 30 BCTs, meaning 41 Active and Guard BCTs will not have this 
type of support.  In an internal split, whereby Active GPF Civil Affairs will only support 
Active BCTs, this brigade still cannot support all units in a consistent fashion.  Thirteen 
still will not have habitual support.  Additionally there would be 84 Reserve Civil Affairs 
companies without a unit alignment.  This route would require further restructuring of the 
Active/Reserve Civil Affairs mix.  By contrast, the Reserves can, on paper support 
approximately 112 BCTs (Department of Defense, 2009, p. 8).  This is not counting their 
proposed growth of an additional 20 companies.   
The phrase “on paper” is used because there are currently many requirements the 
Reserves are filling outside of the BCTs, which directly affects their ability to provide 
support.  Requirements such as Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Kosovo are but two 
examples.  An in depth review should be taken of all current and competing obligations 
currently occupying the Reserve Civil Affairs that inhibit them from aligning with 
conventional units.  A determination is needed as to which missions can be eliminated or 
perhaps turned over to Active Duty Civil Affairs, another component or government 
agency.  End Strength of Reserve Civil Affairs units is also a limitation, suggestions for 
improving this are provided in the attached Appendix (Hartzel, 2009). 
In order to form a complete match between the Reserves and the conventional 
BCTs, the Reserve Civil Affairs would need at least a 2:1 ratio for each supported 
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conventional unit to allow for dwell time.  However, the addition of a “bridging force” 
would gain some ground.  Historically, the Active Civil Affairs units have provided this 
“bridging force.”  Under this scenario, anytime a GPF unit deployed, an Active Civil 
Affairs element would act as the “bridging force.”  In turn, this would cut down on dwell 
issues and allow Civil Affairs to return to an historical model of usage.  However, with 
the Reserves scheduled growth of 20 companies, their ability to support goes up to 132, 
missing the mark of the ratio by only 10.  Thus, the solution provided here is imperfect; 
but an imperfect solution is far better than the current state of ad hoc confusion.  
While this solution is imperfect, it also comes closest to aligning the change to the 
needs of both the SOF community and the GPF community in their likely environment.  
SOF by design will usually operate in areas that have a governmental structure and a 
military with which to work.  In a preventive landscape, this means the emphasis will be 
on the skills the Active Civil Affairs provide.  Essentially these forces are adding to what 
already exists not necessitating the construction of an entirely new capacity.   
The conventional forces conversely still have a primary mission of find, fix, and 
destroy.  Due to this, they have a limited need for Active Civil Affairs skill sets but, over 
time, an expanded need for Reserve Civil Affairs skills.  The Balkans provides an 
excellent example of this.  This expanded need comes after the establishment of security 
and the conventional forces begin to ensure the peace, which tends to require much more 
time.  Iraq is a prime example of this.  By tailoring Civil Affairs to the overall needs of 
the forces success for each is much more likely (Daft, 2004, p. 413).  The course of 
action discussed here could be achieved under either the “Dual Headquarters” GPF or the 
“Single Headquarters” SOF option, but only the latter aligns the Active Civil Affairs to 
the likely environment and provides enough depth combined with flexibility to confront 
the anomalous events possible.  This depth under the “Single Headquarters” SOF 
configuration also provides the best opportunity for Civil Affairs personnel to retain their 
regional and language skills.  The other deficiency, the need for a strategic capacity 
within the Active Civil Affairs has been something long discussed but due to constraints 
has yet to come to fruition. 
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One reason for this lack of action stems from the personnel strength within more 
senior year groups (YG) for Civil Affairs.  A year group is comprised of all officers 
commissioned during that fiscal year.  The year group is then used by U.S. Army Human 
Resources Command to track officers throughout their career for schools, promotion, etc.  
This deficit of personnel will also have a spill-over effect in regards to manning the Civil 
Affairs brigades as most of the Civil Affairs personnel required at the battalion and 
brigade levels need to be experienced so these numbers must be taken into account in that 
regard as well.   
No YGs currently holding the rank of Major are filled to 100% and even if they 
were these YGs were structured prior to the expansion (Human Resources Command, 
2009).  This means these YGs have considerably fewer officers.  Under current 
authorizations, even without growth, this shortfall within the rank of Major will last until 
2016 due to the lack of personnel (Human Resources Command, 2009).  This stems from 
the gains to loss ratio as one YG leaves the rank of Major and another enters.  The chart 
below from Human Resources Command, Civil Affairs branch shows the current CPTs 
strength per YG.  
 
          
Figure 7.   Civil Affairs Captains strength by YG 
As can be seen in the above chart only the more junior officers approach or pass 
100% in terms of personnel, of which only the most junior (YG 2006) is structured for 
the expansion.  The consequence of this deficit is many authorized Civil Affairs positions 
will go unfilled.  Additionally criteria for filling many of the positions will come less 
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from skills and experience, instead becoming more of an availability issue.  This deficit 
will also hamper the branch’s ability to establish more personnel at the strategic level.  
This will continue to be a problem under both models until the junior Captains have 
moved up to more senior roles and the growth is accomplished, unless another approach 
is taken.  The below chart illustrates these shortfalls within the Civil Affairs Major’s 
population. 
 
                                    
Figure 8.   Current Major’s Shortfall 
One possible way to allow quicker growth in the branch’s strategic capacity and 
level off the Major’s deficit is to remove all Active Duty personnel from within the 
BCTs.  Within each BCT, an Active Duty Civil Affairs cell serves as the commander’s 
primary planners and liaison for Civil Affairs forces.  Take out the Active Duty personnel 
and replace them with Active Guard or Reserve (AGR) personnel.  This action will go 
hand in hand with aligning the Reserves to the BCTs and will free up approximately 103 
Active Duty Civil Affairs officers and NCOs for reassignment (Human Resources 
Command, 2009).  This will enable the Active Duty personnel to begin a more robust 
staffing at the strategic level and within governmental agencies, something currently 
lacking within the career field, allowing a more in-depth incorporation of Civil Affairs 
into Theater Security plans.  Some of these personnel could also assist in the Civil Affairs 
training base expansion.  In turn, the Reserve Civil Affairs component will have 
personnel imbedded into units to which they provide support.  As it stands now, Active 
Civil Affairs personnel are advising commanders about units to which they have no 
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connection or knowledge in regards to inherent capabilities.  This proposal would allow 
commanders to have personnel from the unit that directly supports their operations.  This 
action would provide both horizontal and vertical communication to occur within both 
supported and supporting units, increasing their ability to conduct operations (Daft, 2004, 
p. 126).  Unless personnel requirements are addressed and adjusted within the Active 
Civil Affairs branch, the career field will continue to suffer under either configuration.  
The chart below represents the same Major’s shortfall data with the new Civil Affairs 
brigade factored into the equation. 
 
 
Figure 9.   Projected Major’s Shortfall 
The possible course of action discussed for the strategic presence issue is also 
something that could be accomplished under either the “Dual Headquarters” option or the 
“Single Headquarters” SOF option.  Under the “Dual Headquarters” option, however, 
there would now be a competition of resources between the two commands, and internal 
slicing would not be an option.  These competing demands, coupled with the already 
present deficit would cause further strain on Civil Affairs branch and possibly decrease 
its overall ability to provide proper support at higher levels of command.  The needs of 
the likely environment would not be satisfied and Active Civil Affairs would still find 
themselves without depth, in all likelihood continuing to lose regional and language 
skills. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on special operations forces’ (SOF) traditional core missions and 
capabilities, forward global presence and employments, regional 
orientation, unique language skills, and cultural awareness, SOF have and 
will continue to be the premier implementing force for the United States’ 
Preventive Defense – peacetime engagements designed to detect and 
resolve pending crises or conflict and create the conditions that support 
enduring peace.  — General Henry Shelton, 1997. 
Twenty years ago, the debate about the operational placement of Civil Affairs 
assets centered around two main arguments.  The first argument stated that Civil Affairs 
operations were broader than conventional and unconventional warfare and supported 
both.  This argument is no more valid today than it was in 1987.  The same is true of all 
three special operations branches.  While the terms are somewhat dated, each branch 
supports both conventional and unconventional warfare.  The same is also true for 
conventional branches.  Every branch has broader application than to just one type of 
warfare. 
Operational placement of Civil Affairs forces within U. S. Army Special 
Operations Command (USASOC) occurred so that the career field might benefit from the 
unity of command and resource advocacy that only USASOC could provide.  Today this 
is no less true, and perhaps more so.  The Active Branch is less than three years old, and 
has absolutely no personnel over the rank of Colonel.  Due to that there are no senior 
ranking advocates acting solely in the best interest of the young branch.  There needs to 
be advocacy on behalf of Active Civil Affairs at the higher echelons of command.  
Splitting the branch now without any proper advocacy will also split any possibility of 
advocacy within either USASOC or U.S. Army Forces Command.  This could result in 
the two commands attempting to represent their particular slice of Civil Affairs rather 
than advocating for the branch as whole. 
The February 2009, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report 
authored by Kathleen Hicks and Christine Wormuth argued that the original placement of 
Civil Affairs within Special Operations created unique challenges within the branch.  
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This stems from Special Operations forces focusing primarily on direct action, while the 
focus of Civil Affairs operations is on indirect action (Hicks & Wormuth, 2009, p. 35).  
To include all Special Operations forces from all four services, this would be true, but 
Active Army Civil Affairs primarily supports the U.S. Army Special Forces.  Special 
Forces have never been a direct action-centric organization.  Historically and today, the 
majority of their missions have centered on advising, training, working by, with, and 
through host nation militaries.  In truth Special Forces has deviated little from its original 
mission, “to infiltrate by air, sea, or land deep into enemy controlled territory and to stay, 
organize, equip, train, control, and direct indigenous personnel in the conduct of Special 
Forces operations” (Marquis, 1997, p11).  It is the action of the indigenous force, in 
conjunction with the access granted, and mapping of the human terrain by Civil Affairs 
that leads to the highest gains.  This combination of the direct and indirect approaches is 
representative of small footprint or shaping operations. 
Looking back at Civil Affairs before 1987 a researcher is likely to find terms like 
“dead end career field,” “backwater,” or “dumping ground.”  Under Special Operations, 
those perceptions and characterizations have changed.  It is through the placement of 
Active Civil Affairs within Special Operations that has allowed the force as a whole to 
become more professional and more robust.  Complete placement of Active Civil Affairs 
under Special Operations would allow this to continue, and places the Army in a position 
to better deal with emerging threats.   
A. CONCLUSIONS 
As the models developed for this study show, the Army benefits more from Civil 
Affairs within the “Single Headquarters” SOF configuration then it does from having 
Civil Affairs under the “Dual Headquarters” configuration.  While either option attempts 
to address the need for more Civil Affairs forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, only the 
“Single Headquarters” SOF configuration assures use beyond that.  Not having a post-
conflict mission for conventional forces, a mission must be created for the new Civil 
Affairs brigade.  This mission will need to assure regional alignment and require a 
command and control structure yet unseen.  Need should drive creation of a unit; 
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missions should not require creation after the unit.  Only the “Single Headquarters” SOF 
configuration satisfies this truism and environmental requirements.  
Iraq and Afghanistan are presently crucial needs, but there are other emerging 
requirements around the world.  Unfortunately, this new Civil Affairs brigade will likely 
have little to no effect on operations in Iraq or Afghanistan due to the time it will take to 
stand up and equip the new unit.  Moreover, the operational placement of this new Civil 
Affairs brigade must look beyond the current conflicts, less the U.S. military is again 
guilty of planning for the last war.  These future operations will not likely be large-scale 
because of the factors listed in chapter two, but instead will consist of shaping operations.  
A direct threat to the United States is of course a necessary exception.  Initially these 
types of operations will require forces capable of small footprint operations, with regional 
expertise and language skills.  Due to this, these forces must be adept at working both 
through the embassy and with indigenous forces.  Without the listed prerequisite skills, 
the U. S. Army may not have the ability to act in a preventative fashion in line with a 
country’s needs and cultural boundaries.  Only within SOF are these skills, experience 
and training found in abundance.  
The “Single Headquarters” SOF configuration eliminates the competition for 
resources between the new unit and the existing 95th Civil Affairs Brigade in terms of 
personnel and equipment.  Under the “Dual Headquarters” configuration, the 95th Civil 
Affairs Brigade and this new unit would be in direct competition for limited resources.  
The 95th Civil Affairs Brigade is already using a proven technique to allow for stand up 
in a resource-restricted environment, but this would be unavailable if the two units were 
in separate commands and locations.   
The continued atrophy and loss of cultural and language skills within the Active 
Civil Affairs force must be reversed.  If not, the regional alignment within the Active 
component could very well be lost, decreasing their effectiveness at the tactical and 
operational levels.  This too, is best accomplished by the “Single Headquarters” SOF 
configuration.  As seen in the “10-Forward” Model slides the “Dual Headquarters” 
configuration will simply exacerbate an already present situation.  A deployment rotation 
consisting of as little as five BCTs into the same area in a continued manner would 
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completely dismantle any regional alignment within the new brigade.  Having a larger 
pool concentrated under one-command makes it easier to provide support that is actually 
oriented to the area of operation.  To place the new Civil Affairs brigade into the “Dual 
Headquarters” configuration only replicates a mirror image of the 95th Civil Affairs 
Brigade complete with inherent problems and issues.  Due to this even in the unlikely 
situation the conventional forces deploy in large numbers the “Single Headquarters” SOF 
configuration still is able to provide better support in terms of regional alignment.  
However, the second half of the original and current argument, concerning adequate 
support to the conventional forces must also be satisfied by any resolution. 
The research recounted in this study shows that placing the new Civil Affairs 
brigade within the “Dual Headquarters” configuration can bring support to the 
conventional forces, but at substantial cost to the branch and for an uncertain mission 
future.  However, this support will never be habitual due to the number of BCTs within 
the conventional force.  A reasonable course of action must be determined that brings the 
conventional forces the support they need, while still positioning the total Civil Affairs 
force for the emerging environment.  This thesis has provided a reasonable course of 
action able to achieve habitual support for conventional forces, with integrated planning 
capabilities.  This environment may also contain future protracted insurgent conflicts if 
preventive measures fail which may call for the use of both Active and Reserve Civil 
Affairs in conjunction to achieve the desired end-state. 
Since the early 1970s, Civil Affairs’ design has been for a two-stage 
implementation in major combat operations.  The first stage consists of Active forces 
followed by the second stage consisting of Reserve forces after the establishment of 
security.  Active force skills dominate in the initial phases, while Reserve force skills 
dominate in phases IV-V.  Requiring either to operate outside of those bounds will 
decrease their overall utility.  Regardless, each needs the other in order to be truly 
effective at ensuring the peace.  It is in the permissive or semi-permissive environment 
scenario that the Reserve Civil Affairs forces find their highest utility.  This was a painful 
lesson witnessed in Iraq from 2003-2007 and should not go unnoticed.  This will also 
require in depth planning at the strategic and operational levels, as parts of the area of 
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operations may be more secure, so as not to necessitate a “bridging force.”  The in-depth 
planning ability needed at both the strategic and operational levels will not materialize in 
a timely fashion unless alternative measures are taken, as shown in this study. 
Other studies on Civil Affairs have reached similar conclusions regarding the 
future of Civil Affairs assets.  The number one recommendation of the February 2009 
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report authored by Kathleen Hicks 
and Christine Wormuth was to reintegrate all Civil Affairs forces back under USASOC.  
The CSIS report correctly identifies USASOC as the most appropriate organization to act 
as the organizational advocate for Civil Affairs.  As previously discussed, a split in this 
advocacy can do more harm than good for the Civil Affairs branch as a whole.  The 
report, however, fails to document the operational impact of an increased Civil Affairs 
force under USASOC.  Although the report issued by the Center for Strategic and 
Budgetary Assessments authored by Robert Martinage covers the operational impact of 
an increased Civil Affairs presence under USASOC in detail.   
This report entitled Special Operations Forces: Future Challenges and 
Opportunities, calls for the creation of not just one new brigade under USASOC but four 
brigades.  Under the heading, “High Priority Investments for SOCOM’s Subordinate 
Commands” the report outlines the critical need within the operational environment these 
additional forces would fill (Martinage, 2009, p. 53–55).  Four brigades would allow an 
increased presence around the globe, but may prove hard to facilitate due to current force 
caps within the military.  Regardless, the placement that leads to the most utility of any 
new Civil Affairs forces remains the same.  The “Single Headquarters” SOF 
configuration most closely represents the depth required to ensure operational 
effectiveness in any environment while attempting to maintain the skills needed within 
the Civil Affairs career field needed to be successful. 
The Army is faced with a difficult decision and it is not one of right versus wrong, 
but one of right versus right.  This decision falls squarely into short-term versus long-
term.4  There is no one right answer here, only one that is more right than the other.  In 
                                                 
4 One of the common themes of tough choices presented by Rushworth Kidder in How Good People 
Make Tough Choices; Resolving the Dilemmas of Ethical Living. 
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situations where the choice is between short and long term the answer should always fall 
towards the long term (Kidder, 1995).  In this case, the long term is the emerging 
environment and effects on the Active Civil Affairs branch.  Both are better served by the 
“Single Headquarters” SOF configuration.  By utilizing this approach, the Army can 
achieve its goals of an adequate force for the present and build the force needed for the 
future.  
This crucial juncture regarding the future structure of Civil Affairs could shape 
the Army’s ability to confront threats for the mid- to long-term future.  A shortsighted 
decision now could do immense damage to one of the youngest branches in the Active 
Army and one of the most important in the fight against insurgent forces around the 
world.  Taking this brigade out of USASOC and utilizing it to support GPF forces will 
not make these forces more SOF-like, but instead make SOF less capable of meeting 
emerging threats.  There is no question the conventional forces need support now but this 
support should be tailored to allow for long-term use.  To accomplish this, as the models 
have shown, it is imperative to pool the resources of Civil Affairs under USASOC and 
restructure the Reserve Civil Affairs force.  Any other configuration perpetuates 
problems already present, furthering their damage.  The long-term use will come in areas 
where sovereignty and legitimacy are issues; places like the Philippines and Central 
America.  Places that by the very nature of their problems negate the BCT due to size and 
skills.  This new organization should benefit all: conventional forces, SOF, the Army and 
Civil Affairs branch while positioning each for future requirements, only through the 
“Single Headquarters” SOF configuration does this occur.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Align the new Civil Affairs brigade and all Civil Affairs forces under 
USASOC. For the Active Civil Affairs this will ensure a continued mission to all and 
stem the loss of needed regional and language skills.  Under a unified branch, there will 
be no competition for resources or personnel.  Each unit can work in tandem towards full 
operational capacity instead of against the other’s personnel and equipment end strength.  
For the Reserve component, this allows for a less convoluted command structure, and 
reopens MFP-11 funding (Hicks & Wormuth, 2009, p. 37).  It will also give them the 
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needed “bridging force” in protracted engagements.  The increased size of Civil Affairs 
under one command will increase the chances that support given to any unit, in any 
region will receive matching skills for the area of operations.  The more robust package 
within USASOC will ensure the Active component stays appropriately engaged and 
closes USASOC’s mission gap, while maintaining enough flexibility to handle support to 
conventional units as needed.   
Further, in the long term, this placement will allow habitual relationships between 
the conventional forces and the Reserve Civil Affairs.  Due to the geographic location of 
USASOC in relation to the Reserve Civil Affairs command, direct supervision of this 
process is available.    
As the emerging operational environment will likely involve preventive/small 
footprint operations this alignment of the new Civil Affairs brigade under USASOC 
places the additional Civil Affairs forces in the best position to engage in these situations.  
This configuration most closely aligns the Army with the necessary resources needed to 
conduct operations within sovereign, friendly nations were legitimacy is a concern.  
However, this option gives enough flexibility to ensure conventional forces have regional 
support with the capability to conduct full spectrum operations when required.    
2. Align Reserve Civil Affairs force with BCTs and increase force 
structure. This was to have occurred after the split in 2006, but did not happen.  The 
conventional forces both need and deserve proper habitual support.  Only the Reserve 
Civil Affairs component has the capacity to provide this support.  The Reserve Civil 
Affairs force is a key element in positioning both Civil Affairs and the Army in regards to 
emerging threats.  The appendix attached outlines certain recommendations in achieving 
these goals.   
Increasing the force structure of the Reserve Civil Affairs by approximately 10 
additional companies will allow a 2:1 ratio BCT to aligned Reserve Civil Affairs unit.  
This will enable the Reserve Civil Affairs component to better provide habitual support 
to all conventional units Active or otherwise. 
3. Take Active Duty Civil Affairs personnel out of BCTs replacing them 
with Reserve personnel. Within each BCT, an Active Duty Civil Affairs cell serves as 
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the commander’s primary planners and liaison for Civil Affairs forces.  Take out the 
Active Duty personnel and replace them with Active Guard or Reserve personnel.  This 
will enable the Active Duty personnel to begin a more robust staffing at the strategic 
level, something currently lacking within the career field.  In turn, the Reserves will have 
personnel imbedded into the supported units.  Who better to advise a commander of a 
unit’s capability than an actual member of that organization?   
4. Train the conventional force in rudimentary Civil Affairs 
operations/application and capabilities/limitations of Civil Affairs. No model or 
configuration allows all to have complete and total support in a habitual fashion from 
Civil Affairs personnel   This may require some units, SOF and GPF, to conduct Civil 
Affairs activities on their own.  In order to do this Civil Affairs must train the force in 
operations and application.  Just as each soldier in the U.S. Army, from private to 
general, knows how to operate a radio each soldier and officer should be able to conduct 
rudimentary Civil Affairs operations (Hicks & Wormuth, 2009, p. 42).  This is currently 
being done, but not with Civil Affairs instructors.  While the individual may be familiar 
with the practices, in all likelihood they will be deficient in the intricacies and nuances of 
the objectives. 
This instruction should also include capabilities and limitations within the Civil 
Affairs community.  While one Active Civil Affairs Team is the same as another in terms 
of skills and equipment there is a wide range of differences between the Reserves and the 
Active component.  These differences need complete understanding at all levels.  This 
will ensure the right forces are applied to the right missions and allow for greater utility 
when is use. 
5. Conduct a comprehensive study of Reserve Civil Affairs requirements 
to determine what requirements can be eliminated and what requirements can be 
taken over by other military or governmental agencies. Several requirements are 
currently placed on the Reserve Civil Affairs force, which directly affects their ability to 
support the conventional units.  This study will determine non-essential requirements 
currently tasked to the Reserves, as well as identify any requirements for transfer to 
another element or agency.   
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APPENDIX A.5 ANALYSIS OF THE RESERVE CIVIL AFFAIRS 
COMPONENT  
A. BACKGROUND 
From 1991 until 2006, the U.S. Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations 
Command (USACAPOC), at Fort Bragg, NC, exercised direct control over all Active and 
Reserve Civil Affairs forces in the U.S. Army.  During this time, USACAPOC, which 
was an Army Reserve command, was subordinate to the U.S. Army Special Operations 
Command (USASOC).  This unique relationship was tied to the fact that approximately 
96% of all CA units were part of the U.S. Army Reserve, as well as 66% of all 
Psychological Operations forces.   
On 12 January 2004, then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who was 
concerned about the increasing violence in Iraq, issued an internal memo, known as a 
“snowflake,” to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard B. Meyers.  
The memo asked, “Should Civil Affairs forces be removed from USASOC and placed in 
direct support of General Purpose Forces (GPF)” (Ricks, 2005).  At the time of this 
request, the majority of USASOC units were engaged in Direct Action missions against 
known and suspected terrorist targets, a mission set that rarely required Civil Affairs 
support.  The Secretary of Defense thought that Civil Affairs forces could be better 
utilized in a direct support role to GPF.   
The Army attempted to meet the spirit of the Secretary of Defense’s request by 
moving Reserve Civil Affairs forces from USASOC to the U.S. Army Reserve Command 
(USARC) and aligned with GPF maneuver brigades.  The active Civil Affairs 
component, the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, would remain under USASOC (Ricks, 
2005).  The anticipated result would be increased Civil Affairs support to GPF because 
they would have the bulk of the force, approximately 96%, committed to conventional 
missions.  The 96th Civil Affairs Battalion would remain in USASOC in order to retain 
                                                 
5 This appendix is the work of the author, 2009. 
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the long-term relationships between the battalion and the five active duty Special Forces 
Groups.  Additionally, the 96th would eventually expand into a Civil Affairs Brigade in 
order to fulfill future USASOC requirements.  The separation of Active and Reserve 
Civil Affairs took place in June 2006, an event now commonly known as “the divorce.”   
This appendix will examine USACAPOC in its current configuration and 
determine how well it fits into its new role supporting GPF.  This appendix will only 
focus on Civil Affairs forces, thus no examination of Psychological Operations will be 
provided. 
B. MISSION 
USACAPOC’s mission statement is, “To man, organize, train, equip, and 
resource Army Reserve Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Forces for worldwide 
support to combatant commanders and other agencies, as directed.”6  However, as will be 
shown the training received by Reserve Civil Affairs does not support this regional 
concept, thereby negating USACAPOC’s basic structure, which is designed to fulfill this 
mission statement.  By examining the organization, training, environment and the 
prescribed capabilities outlined in FM 3-5.40 Civil Affairs Operations, one can see that 
USACAPOC and the Army would be much better served if the structure and organization 
were modified.  This modification will cause the creation of a new mission statement that 
incorporates the conditions of the 2006 realignment and the limited regional ability that 
actually exists within the Reserve Civil Affairs. 
C.  ORGANIZATION 
USACAPOC is organized as a divisional structure, with four Civil Affairs 
Commands (CACOM), and supporting brigades and battalions as seen in Figure 10. 
 
 
                                                 
6 This mission statement taken directly from the command overview brief for the Civil Affairs 
Association by MG David A. Morris, commander USACAPOC, dated 8 November 2008. 
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402, 478 — Direct Reporting Units 
Figure 10.   Internal Organization 
According to Henry Mintzberg, noted academic in the field of organizational 
design, an organization divisionalizes because its product lines are diversified, above all 
other reasons (Mintzberg, 1981, p. 9).  USACAPOC, as shown above, is regionally 
aligned with all combatant commands in order to provide regional and cultural expertise 
for the supported commanders.  However, as will be shown, the reality is USACAPOC 
does not have the inherent skills to provide this aligned support.  The current skills within 
USACAPOC better match those of U.S. Forces Command, which makes the organization 
more attuned to provide support to Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) as outlined in 2006.  
These BCTs are not regionally aligned, and therefore, do not require a diversified 
regional product line.  Moreover, as will be shown, no training model has ever supported 
this type regionally aligned configuration. 
Additionally, the current configuration contains no horizontal linkages between 
the supported Brigade Combat Teams and USACAPOC.  Consequently, a Civil Affairs 
unit and a BCT do not have an established working relationship, nor will they have 
conducted any joint training exercises prior to deploying.  Horizontal communication 
helps to overcome barriers and provides for coordination to achieve unity of effort (Daft, 
2001, p. 126).  Two of the strongest horizontal linkages possible for the Civil Affairs unit 
are the full time integrator and teams (Daft, 2001, p126).  Currently, each BCT has a 
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Civil Affairs planning cell, who serves as the full-time integrator and team.  However, 
these members are active duty personnel, with no connection to any Reserve Civil Affairs 
units.  A possible solution would be to replace the active duty officer with a member 
from the Active Guard or Reserve (AGR).  The AGR BCT Civil Affairs officer would 
serve as the integrator while the AGR NCOs serving within Civil Affairs planning cell 
would comprise the team.  Ideally, this would give the BCT commander a direct link to 
his supporting Civil Affairs unit, thus helping to coordinate training and other necessary 
activities prior to deployment.     
This configuration will not give a link between the BCT and the Active Civil 
Affairs Team that will provide the “bridging force” to the Reserves.  This is mitigated by 
the fact that all Active Civil Affairs Teams come with the same skill sets, resources, and 
training.  Reserve units come with many varied skills sets; it is here that the linkage is the 
most important.  This adjustment to the coordination between the BCT and the Civil 
Affairs unit would lead to a more stable relationship between the two organizations.  The 
BCT Civil Affairs Planning cell becomes a support staff for both the Civil Affairs unit 
and the BCT.  The planning cell simplifies the overall work process of communications, 
resourcing, and training for both units involved.  It would also help to mitigate a problem 
discussed later and that is the misuse of Civil Affairs personnel, but first the internal 
training aspects need to be examined.   
D.  TRAINING 
Under the current training guidelines of the U.S. Army Special Warfare Center 
and School, the Reserve training program is supposed to produce an adaptive and 
culturally aware leader.  This is in addition to mastering the tradecraft of tactical Civil 
Affairs operations (Mundell, 2007).  However, while USACAPOC is structured for a 
regionally diversified output with regional expertise and linguistic capability, the training 
pipeline is not equipped to provide this output.  All products of both current and past 
training were not diversified regionally and did not receive additional language training.  
Over the previous five years, there have been three different Reserve training models, and 
each will be covered. 
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The first example for Reserve Civil Affairs training is the pre-2004 model.  This 
model, which all Reserve Civil Affairs officers trained under, was the standard from the 
inception of USACAPOC in 1991 until 2005.  Newly minted Civil Affairs officers had to 
attend the 4 week Civil Affairs Qualification Course (CAQC) in resident status, or attend 
the Reserve Civil Affairs Officer Advanced Course (CAOAC), which consisted of a 
resident and non-resident portion.  After completing either of these programs, the 
graduate was a fully trained Reserve Civil Affairs officer.  This training pipeline is 
depicted in Figure 11.  
 
 
Figure 11.   Initial Training Pipeline (Mundell, 2007) 
The pre-2004 Reserve Civil Affairs training pipeline offered minimum training 
time in comparison to the conventional Officers Advanced Course, which averages six 
months in length.  Instead, it is more similar to the Reserve Judge Advocate General’s 
Advanced Courses, which is a 2-week course in Fort Lee, VA (www.jagcnet.army.mil).  
This pipeline offered minimum training because it relied on the presumption that the 
Reserve Civil Affairs officer already possessed necessary professional skills.  In addition, 
the pre-2004 model offered regional specialties and languages by exception only.  In 
summary, the Civil Affairs officer’s functional skills were more desirable than advanced 
soldiering skills.   
A functional Civil Affairs soldier maintains one or more of a set of highly prized 
civilian skills that translate well into Civil Affairs operations.  These skills include, but 
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are not limited to, public administration, law enforcement, community health, and/or city 
planning.  As a reservist, the Civil Affairs officer maintains these skills every day in their 
civilian careers.  During military operations, these skills translate well into the functional 
roles of capacity building, sustainment, and reconstruction.   
Additionally, the active military is not equipped to maintain a high degree of 
proficiency in advanced Civil Affairs activities as practiced by functionalists.  Thus, the 
active military focuses on training generalists, who are capable of ensuring immediate 
life sustaining measures, such as well emplacement or the delivery of humanitarian aid.  
While helpful in the immediate term, the generalist is not equipped to facilitate 
reconstruction or large-scale capacity building.  In 2005, the Reserve Civil Affairs 




Figure 12.   Transformed Training Pipeline (Mundell, 2007) 
The 2005–2007 Reserve Civil Affairs training model was designed to give the 
Reserve officer the same training as Active Duty, less the language requirement.  This 
model fit well into the structure of USACAPOC by giving regional exposure and the core 
competencies of the Civil Affairs branch but required a high degree of resident training 
not allowing it to be user friendly for the Reserve component.  Due to the restraints of 
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this model, its usage only lasted approximately two years.  Ironically, this training model 
most closely fits into the desired end state necessary for the overall structure of the 
organization as a whole.  Despite the close fit, the training again changed in 2008 due to 
its limitations in feasibility. 
The newest Reserve Civil Affairs training pipeline involves 4 phases, two resident 
phases and two distance-learning phases.  The initial phase (Phase I) is a distance 
learning module consisting of Basic Branch skills, knowledge and ability and must be 
completed in three months.  Phase II is a resident course that teaches the core 
competencies of the Civil Affairs career field.  These core competencies include populace 
and resource control, foreign humanitarian assistance, nation assistance, civil information 
management, and support to civil administration.  Phase III shifts back to distance 
learning; in this phase, systems of systems analysis, civil affairs systems analysis and 
civil affairs planning are taught and students have eight months to complete the phase.  
Phase IV is a three week resident course involving civil affairs review and integration 
into the military decision making process followed by a culminating exercise (Mundell, 
2007).  At no point during this course are regional and language skills taught or enhanced 
despite both being necessary to support the current USACAPOC structure.  This training 
pipeline is depicted in Figure 13.  
 
 
Figure 13.   Current Training Pipeline (Mundell, 2007) 
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The number one goal for this current training pipeline, as stated by the U.S. Army 
Special Warfare Center, was to produce a competent Civil Affairs Team Leader 
(Mundell, 2007).  This stated goal indicates a shift from a functional skill set (specialist) 
to an emphasis on tactical level operations (generalist).  This change in focus was a 
fundamental mistake for the Reserve Civil Affairs force, for the strength of the Reserve 
Civil Affairs force is the civilian skills that are resident in its members, not its tactical 
proficiency.   
The pipeline changes reflected the new demands of the operating environment.  
This new demand is neither surprising nor unwarranted.  In 2005, as now, there are two 
active wars, with an insatiable demand for the limited inventory of trained Civil Affairs 
Soldiers.  Additionally, the shift in focus reflected the reality of the time:  it was much 
easier to recruit and train generalists than to find and retain functional experts.   
Finally, there is a fourth training program, currently designed to meet the 
immediate needs of deploying Civil Affairs units.  The Civil Affairs Course—
Mobilization (CAQC-M)—was originally a 10-day program (90 training hours), designed 
to refresh the training of former civil affairs personnel.  In 2005, the course was extended 
to 4 weeks and, in 2006 expanded to 9 weeks.  Additionally, it was opened up to all 
officers being called back to duty from the Individual Ready Reserve filling a Civil 
Affairs billet. 
Graduates of CAQC-M would immediately deploy as a Civil Affairs officer and 
fill a Civil Affairs role in their unit.  Upon their return, the officer would receive full 
branch qualification in their pay grade.  While CAQC-M does not encompass the whole 
of the CA tasks trained in the standard pipeline, it provides enough training for the officer 
to succeed during the deployment.  Approximately 254 Army Officers were trained under 
this program in FY 2007 (Mundell, 2007).  
The important question from the changes to the training pipeline is whether 
USACAPOC should train soldiers to be generalists, or to expand recruitment efforts to 
find specialists.  If USACAPOC went for the recruitment model, it could then teach 
specialists about Civil Affairs and the value of their skill sets.  Then, the potential recruits 
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could make informed decisions on whether or not to apply their expertise in the civilian 
sector as well as serving their country.  In order to answer this question the stated internal 
capabilities within USACAPOC must be understood. 
E. INTERNAL CAPABILITIES  
Civil Affairs commands provide expertise in six functional specialty areas: rule of 
law, economic stability, governance, public health and welfare, infrastructure, and public 
education and information.  U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs brigades and battalions 
have capabilities in four of the functional specialty areas: rule of law, governance, health 
and welfare, and infrastructure.  These functional specialists, especially at the operational 
and strategic levels, may be employed in general support of interagency operations, in 
addition to direct support of military operations.  There are no functional experts at the 
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Published in September 2006, Field Manual 3-5.40 Civil Affairs Operations is 
markedly different from its predecessor, Field Manual 41-10.  The primary difference 
between the two documents is the shift from the functional specialist to the generalist 
within the Reserve Civil Affairs.    
 Previously, there were 16 functional specialties.  Now, there are only six 
broad specialty areas.   
 All capabilities of the internal structures are focused on stabilization and 
reconstruction except at the tactical level.  Each should have a common goal.  
In the previous internal organization as outlined in Field Manual 41-10, this 
capability was inherent in all from the company level up to the Civil Affairs 
command.   
 Each battalion was configured with one Functional Specialty Company, each 
consisting of 5 functional specialty teams:  Public Health Team, Dislocated 
Civilians Team, Civilian Supply Team, Public Administration Team, and a 
Public Works and Utilities Team.  Now, there is only a Functional Specialty 
Cell located within the Battalion.   
 Previously there were only four generalist companies.  Now, there are five 
generalist companies, with no specialty company.  
F. ENVIRONMENT 
Richard Daft, author of Essentials of Organizational Theory and Design, defines 
the environment as all elements that exist outside the boundary of the organization and 
have the potential to affect all or part of the organization (Daft, 2001 p 48).  The 
changing environment has played a key role in the development of USACAPOC into its 
current form.   
Prior to 2001, the operating environment was less demanding, and placed little 
pressure on the organization.  Operations were generally small in scale, predictable, and 
of relatively short duration.  Bosnia and Kosovo were exceptions because of their 
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duration.  However, the high level of security allowed for a routine rotation schedule.  
Without a high demand for civil affairs, the organization could easily mitigate crises or 
contingencies.  The Army, minus Special Operations, did not see a great deal of value in 
Civil Affairs.  Until 2001, the Army was training and preparing for a linear confrontation 
with a conventional enemy, a conflict where Civil Affairs would only play a minor role in 
post-conflict activities.   
Additionally, the economic situation did not increase demand for a trained Civil 
Affairs force.  With a vibrant job market and healthy economy, there was little to offer 
the professional worker to leave his job and sacrifice to serve in Civil Affairs (or the 
military in general).  Throughout this pre-war period, USACAPOC experienced neither 
an excessive amount of operational strain nor a demand to aggressively train for future 
conflicts.   
After September 11, 2001, USACAPOC’s environment completely changed.  The 
United States was now at war against an irregular-force enemy operating in Afghanistan, 
an extremely poor country.  In 2003, the United States began operations in Iraq, which 
was more modern than Afghanistan, but one that had deteriorated under a decade of 
international sanctions and an oppressive regime.  On top of this, the demands in the 
Balkans were still in place.  By 2004, the Army had begun to shift its focus to non-linear 
confrontations, which placed a great deal of emphasis on Civil Affairs’ role on the 
battlefield.  
A non-linear environment places a heavy demand on functional capabilities across 
the entire conflict.  Thus, not having this ability at every level is a severe limitation.  
Under USACAPOC’s current configuration, all elements must be located in the same 
area in order to utilize their functional capability.  This top-down approach to operations 
is ineffective in a non-linear environment (as seen from the Forward Operating Base 
approach in Iraq).  In order to be effective in a non-linear environment, Civil Affairs 
teams must deploy and work among the local population.  This level of employment 
requires functional skills at the team level, or a bottom-up approach.  The technological 
answer, known as reach-back, is an ineffective alternative.   
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When the environment changes an organization is faced with two choices:  
redesign its structure to maintain external fit or maintain internal consistency (Mintzberg, 
p. 16).  USACAPOC has not redesigned its structure, and it instead changed its internal 
consistency by placing the skills of the generalist over the skills of the functional 
specialist. 
Reserve soldiers cannot be deployed like Active Duty soldiers.  For every year a 
Reserve soldier is deployed, they must remain stateside for a prescribed amount of time.  
This constraint, known as dwell time, not only limits unit availability, but also highlights 
personnel shortages after high intensity or long duration deployments.  Most maneuver 
commanders, unfamiliar in the use of Reserve Civil Affairs, wanted their contingent of 
Civil Affairs on-hand, in spite of the security situation in theater.  In these instances, only 
tactical Civil Affairs teams, which can mitigate immediate suffering, are useful.  Reserve 
Civil Affairs teams cannot conduct reconstruction and stabilization operations in an 
insecure environment.  By demanding Reserve Civil Affairs presence in non-permissive 
environments, maneuver commanders inadvertently wasted their inherent strength and 
created dwell time issues.  This, in turn, created the need to expand Civil Affairs 
Qualification Course-Mobilization and further fueled the emphasis on generalist skills. 
G. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Drop the regional concept for the majority of Reserve Civil Affairs 
units and realign their support to GPF.  USACAPOC set an admirable goal of 
establishing Reserve Civil Affairs units with regional alignments and cultural expertise.  
Unfortunately, there has never been a training model that fully supports this.  This 
regional concept should be dropped in all elements except the Civil Affairs commands.  
The Civil Affairs commands directly support combatant commanders, and have 
established long standing habitual relationships.  Civil Affairs commands would serve as 
intended:  advisor to the combatant commander and liaison to Reserve Civil Affairs 
elements operating within theater.  This would also allow vertical information systems to 
remain constant within theater.  
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By eliminating regional alignments, USACAPOC could begin to align their 
brigades and battalions with GPF units.  BCT commanders should know exactly where 
their Civil Affairs support comes from.  Once this new alignment is complete, 
USACAPOC can begin to assign integrators and teams within the supported units.  The 
teams will establish horizontal linkages and build the relationships required to operate 
effectively. 
Pre-operational training in the near-term will be an issue due to “dwell” concerns.  
Dwell is the term used to describe a Reserve units time in a non-activated status.  Due to 
the high operational tempo, this has become an ever-increasing problem for the Reserve 
force.  In the interim, the ability of the Active forces should be examined to determine the 
feasibility of fulfilling this role in the short term.  As the operational tempo subsides, the 
Reserves should be able to fulfill this capacity.  
2. USACAPOC must educate the shareholder (i.e., GPF units). To 
facilitate the alignment of Reserve Civil Affairs to BCTs the integrators embedded in the 
BCTs should begin training and educating the conventional force immediately.  One 
function of this training should be instruction on the proper usage of Commander’s 
Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds.  Local commanders use their discretion to 
utilize CERP funds for financing low scale projects to mitigate needs within the civilian 
population.  These tasks, normally executed by tactical Civil Affairs, could easily be 
taken over by maneuver rifle platoons, acting under the direct supervision of the 
embedded planning cell.  BCT troops should have the skills to operate in this fashion in 
the event of a worst-case scenario. 
A separate function of this education would be on how to best utilize Reserve 
Civil Affairs Forces.  As stated earlier, security is required in order to begin stabilization 
and reconstruction.  An Active duty “bridging force” may be required to facilitate certain 
aspects of operations and would be invaluable in terms of transition.  Once the area is 
secure, the necessary components can arrive and begin operations, though coordination 
between the planning cell and the Civil Affairs command.  This process can occur at 
different times in different areas of operations.  The relationship between the Civil 
Affairs command and the Civil Affairs Planning cell is what will allow this to happen.   
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Proper force utilization also affects another aspect of Reserve Civil Affairs: dwell 
time.  Dwell time, as previously stated, is necessary for Reserves.  For Civil Affairs, this 
time in the civilian sector is vital to maintain their proficiency in their specific skill.  
Supported commanders must be fully aware of both the strengths and weaknesses of the 
forces under their control.  They must understand what is required of them to ensure the 
greatest success.  This can only be accomplished through direct communication between 
the Reserve Civil Affairs unit, the Civil Affairs Planning Cell, and the supported 
maneuver commander.  If this is accomplished maneuver commanders will understand, 
there is no need for the bulk of the Reserve Civil Affairs compliment to be in theater 
unless security has been completely established.  This in turn will, at a minimum, cut 
down on the dwell time issues being currently experienced by the Reserve Civil Affairs 
forces.   
Another aspect of the education process would take place during pre-mobilization 
and training.  Throughout the pre-mob process, the incoming Civil Affairs elements 
would receive up-to-date information from the liaison via input from the rifle platoons or 
“bridging force.”  This would improve the unit’s situational awareness, and help them to 
adequately prepare to support the commander upon arrival.    
3. Aggressive recruitment and retention of functional expertise from the 
civilian sector is vital.  Reserve Civil Affairs forces bring one of the most important 
skills to any fight be it linear or non-linear: the ability to ensure the peace.  Several high-
ranking civilian Department of Defense officials and military officers have described 
civil Affairs as a crucial capability owing to its functional specialty skills (Civil Affairs 
Association, 2007).  If these functional skills continue to decline, then USACAPOC may 
lose this ability.   
In order to find and retain these skills, USACAPOC should aggressively target 
potential recruits.  One possible example is to focus on economic concerns.  Today’s 
economy is nothing like the economy of the 1990’s.  One way to court potential talent is 
to offer direct commissions to qualified individuals.  Much like the Army Judge 
Advocate General program and Medical Officers program, professionals with a desirable 
skill set and education can become a Reserve Army officer.  Based on their skills, they 
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can start as a first lieutenant, captain, or major.  Once commissioned, the new officers 
would attend Basic Officers Leaders Course, and then complete Civil Affairs training.   
If the potential reservist possesses a valuable skill set, but does not have the 
necessary professional education (e.g., construction or plumbing), then the individual can 
join as E-4 or higher depending on experience.  Following basic training, the new Soldier 
or Sergeant would attend Civil Affairs training.  Another way would be to offer skill set 
bonuses.  Keeping these needed skill sets and rewarding individuals for their proficiency 
would help in the field of retention.   
These are only two examples, and are not an exhaustive list.  As the economy 
continues to struggle, some people will look for job opportunities.  Others will look for a 
greater purpose in their life.  USACAPOC could provide them with both.   
4. Actively manage the specialties within the Civil Affairs Career Field.   
There is no fixed way to determine a Soldier’s civilian specialty.  Each member of the 
Reserve Civil Affairs career field should bring some outside complimentary skill with 
them.  Once assessed, they should be further classified by functional specialty and 
supporting career field.  For example, within the “Rule of Law” functional area, one 
could find lawyers, judges, police officers, etc.  Each career field has specific education 
and experience requirements.  This breakdown will help recruiters to pinpoint specific 
places and events to talk to potential recruits.   
Additionally, the required expertise helps to design adequate incentive packages 
for potential recruits.  Even more importantly, this breakdown would give USACAPOC 
the ability to manage specific skill sets for recruitment so they can pursue exactly what it 
is they need the most.  This will help the command to better anticipate and support future 
recruiting and retention efforts.    
5. Return the emphasis on functional specialties.  The functional 
specialties, rule of law, governance, infrastructure, etc., are considered the “crown 
jewels” of Civil Affairs (Civil Affairs Association, 2007, p. 2-1).  USACAPOC should 
not allow any training that does not take this into account.  As explained, there has been a 
noticeable shift, both in training and doctrine, which has placed the generalist above the 
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functional specialist.  In order to maximize its utility, USACAPOC must go back to 
placing emphasis on the functional teams, transforming all current Civil Affairs Teams 
into Tactical Functional Teams.  This will maximize their utility from the bottom up. 
This effort to make all Civil Affairs generalists has been faulty from the very 
beginning.  The Active Duty side of Civil Affairs will never have the civilian skills the 
Reserves bring to the fight; it simply cannot train enough to meet those extremely high 
professional standards.  Conversely, Reserve Civil Affairs will never be as tactically 
proficient as the Active Duty, and to expect such proficiency is dangerous.  Currently, 
Reserve Civil Affairs forces have one of the Army’s highest proportional casualty rates in 
the ongoing conflicts (Holshek, 2007, p 9).  This is in contrast to only three Active Duty 
personnel killed in action, despite having been involved in the conflict for a longer 
duration.  The more the Reserves train to be like Active Duty, the more they decrease 
their utility and the farther they move away from their doctrinally stated goal of providing 
stabilization, reconstruction, and development.   
The skills of the Reserve Civil Affairs Soldier are important now, and will only 
become more important in the future.  Thus, the organization dynamics in place now will 
have lasting effects if not addressed.  There is a fundamental mismatch between 
USACAPOC’s organization, training, and employment with respect to GPF 
requirements.  USACAPOC is moving in the wrong direction, and must change course in 
order to maximize the effectiveness of the Reserve Civil Affairs.  The current economy 
and the impeding force reduction in Iraq may provide the means.  The ways listed within 
this appendix coupled with the means can equate to the desired end state:  a GPF aligned 
USACAPOC, focused on functional skills, and ready to sustain the victory.   
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APPENDIX B.7 PHILIPPINES AND COLOMBIAN CASE STUDIES 
Historically SOF has always had a higher operational tempo then their GPF 
counterparts and nothing on the horizon would suggest a change to this.  All indicators 
point that this will continue.  When dealing with irregular threats it is essential to have 
the capability for a bottom up approach.  This means having personnel that can interact 
with the populace at the lowest levels to build rapport and capacity.  Due to their regional 
and language skills, Civil Affairs are among these forces.  This becomes more effective if 
done in a preemptive fashion.  In doing so relationships are formed and trust built before 
an internal crisis gains momentum (Rothstein, 2007).  Forces under SOF conducting their 
missions worldwide are already accomplishing this task.  By manning the force that will 
conduct these operations with adequate tools allows for a more effective military option.   
A. PHILIPPINES 
Following World War II in 1946 and independence insurgencies still racked the 
Philippines.  From the Hukbalahap Insurgency to the groups currently seen insurgency 
has been almost a time-honored tradition in the Philippines.  However, today with the 
world shrinking due to globalization these groups have the ability to import tactics and 
techniques making them more dangerous and if left unchecked a  threat to United States 
strategic interests.  
In February 2002 the United States deployed Joint Task Force 510 (JTF-510) into 
the Philippines for Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P) consisting of 160 
Special Forces troops and one company of Civil Affairs (Rothstein, 2007).  Force cap 
constraints set in place by the Philippine government did not allow for a more robust 
package.  These troops deployed in order to work by, with and through their Philippine 
counterparts in order to disrupt and destroy the Abu Sayaf Group (ASG), while lending 
legitimacy to the Philippine government.  Ustad Abdurazak, Abubakar Janjalani, Wahab 
Akbar, Amilhussin Jumaani and 10 former members of the MNLF formed the ASG in the 
                                                 
7 This appendix is the work of the author, 2009. 
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mid-1980s (Fernandes, 2008, p. 196).  Most of the leadership had spent time in the 
Middle East and many had received their initial training in the terrorist camps in 
Afghanistan, later practicing their skills against the Soviets (Rothstein, 2007).  While not 
directly connected to al-Qaida it was Osama Bin Laden’s brother-in-law who provided 
ASG with its initial funding (Rothstein, 2007).  Located on Basilan Island this group was 
involved in high profile kidnappings, rape and murder in order to control the island 
(Wendt, 2005).   
Plans for the mission to the Philippines began shortly after the attacks of 
September 11, 2001.  By Jan 2002, members of Bravo Company, 96th Civil Affairs 
Battalion had orders to send the teams first to Okinawa then to the Philippines.  Once on 
Okinawa the teams began in depth planning with 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group 
to whom they were attached (Walley, 2004). 
Several Civil Affairs teams were initially prevented from entering the Philippines 
due to the force cap placed on American personnel.  Many within the Philippines felt the 
presence of foreign troops on Philippine soil was a violation of their Constitution.  Due to 
this, only CAT-A23 was permitted to deploy to Basilan Island.  Upon arrival, the team 
immediately began to do assessments of the island.  Their assessments revealed that no 
nongovernmental organizations had operated on Basilan since 1999 and the inhabitants of 
the island lived in extremely poor conditions.  These assessments also showed the 
islanders lacked educational opportunities and proper medical care after the insurgents 
drove out many of the teachers and medical personnel.  Additionally, their water was 
unsafe to drink and electricity was not common (Walley, 2004). 
Due to the force protection requirements, the Civil Affairs Teams operated in 
close conjunction with their Special Forces counterparts.  A Special Forces team consists 
of 12 personnel, but a Civil Affairs team consists of only four.  This makes it impossible 
to operate in a non-permissive environment without support.  Collaborating with the 
Special Forces team not only allows for greater force protection, but also enhances the 
abilities of each team in terms of COIN.  A Civil Affairs team is comprised of a Team 
Leader, Team Sergeant, Team Engineer and Team Medic.  A Special Forces team usually 
has a Team Leader, Team Sergeant, two Weapons Sergeants, two Communications 
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Sergeants, an Assistant Team Leader, two Engineer Sergeants and two Medical 
Sergeants.  Having three highly trained medics and three engineers between the teams 
allows each to create a greater difference within their operating environment.  In an ideal 
situation, both teams are proficient in language and local area cultural practices. 
Surveys conducted by both the Special Forces teams and the Civil Affairs teams 
led to a priority list of projects by the Joint Task Force.  The top three on the list were 
potable water, improvement of medical facilities and establishing clinics, and 
improvement of transportation infrastructure.  Potable water was of the highest priority 
due to the high rate of water born disease, which in turn caused a high infant mortality 
rate (Walley, 2004). 
In the summer of 2002, Pacific Area Command (PACOM) approved the proposed 
Medical Civil Affairs Program (MEDCAP).  As in most areas, these MEDCAPs were some 
of the most successful programs instituted in the Philippines.  Not only do these types of 
operations genuinely help the people, but they also assist in building relationships with 
the local populace.  Having additional medics allows for more people to be treated and 
more to be influenced.  Villagers in Turburan were so grateful for the medical attention 
they began informing American personnel of impending ASG attacks (Walley, 2004). 
By November 2003, more than 30,000 people had received treatment by 
MEDCAP programs set up and run by U.S. Special Operations.  Navy Seabees, working 
through Civil Affairs had constructed a C-130 capable runway, and cleared eight 
helicopter-landing zones for casualty evacuation.  The Seabees also repaired or improved 
80 km of road, allowing greater access to the area by government forces (Wally, 2004).  
While these numbers are impressive, the projects in and of themselves are nothing if no 
effect was achieved.  These projects, however, did produce the desired effect.  
Unlike Afghanistan and Iraq, the Philippine government was an ally of the United 
States and consequently a large-scale deployment of combat troops to conduct a shaping 
operation was not an option.  The United States kept the deployment package small, with 
extremely restrictive rules of engagement because many within the Philippines did not 
want large amounts of foreign troops (Rothstein, 2007).  Originally comprised of fewer 
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than 200 personnel, at its height JTF-510 consisted of approximately 1,200 personnel to 
include augmentations of navy and marine construction units to assist with civic action 
projects (Rothstein, 2007).  By 2004, all American forces had withdrawn from Basilan 
Island, and the ASG had all but ceased operations in the area (Wendt, 2005).  The 
Philippine government was also able to reduce its forces from seven infantry battalions to 
only two and violent incidents dropped dramatically (Rothstein, 2007).  It is important to 
note that over the course of the engagement, according to Colonel Coultrup, current task 
force commander, most of the effort had been “civil-military operations to change the 
conditions that allow those high-value targets to have a safe haven.  We do that through 
helping give a better life to the citizens: good governance, better health care, a higher 
standard of living,” (Shanker, 2009). 
The Philippine case offers us an example of how Active Civil Affairs forces could 
expect utilization within special operations.  Further, it gives a glimpse of the likely 
future environment in which the U.S. military can expect to operate.  The Philippines 
were an allied country, facing an internal insurgent movement intent on delegitimizing 
the acting regime.  Due to issues of sovereignty, the insertion of troops was small; thus 
ensuring acceptance by the Philippine population (Barnes, 2009).  A contingent larger 
than the country was willing to accept or one without the proper skills could not have 
accomplished so much in such a short amount of time.  This however, is not the only 
example of success from this force configuration.  Colombia bears striking similarities.  
B. COLOMBIAN CASE STUDY 
As Colombia progressed from the 19th to the 20th century, remnants of Spanish 
rule continued to hamper its efforts for a stabile society.  The Spanish created wide 
divisions within the society culminating in the political bodies of the Conservative and 
Liberal factions.  The two factions were divided on the amount of governmental control 
necessary for the Colombian government and the extent of power the Church should 
have.  Federalism backed by Liberals called for a weaker central government role, while 
centralism advocated by Conservatives consolidated power in the central government.  
The Liberals also felt the Church was too powerful and constricted economic and social 
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development, while the Conservatives believed the Church should play a central role in 
the state’s affairs (Safford & Palacios, 2004, p. 156).  These factions created the means 
for political violence contributing to the Civil War 1899-1902 and later to the creation of 
insurgent movements (Maulin, 1973, p. 14).  The insurgent movements to come were not 
spontaneous creations, but instead more of an evolutionary process.8  
The first phase is violence of political partisanship that began in 1945 and ended 
in 1953.  The violence ignited during the electoral campaigns of 1945-46 and it is 
estimated that some 20,000 men were organized for the effort (Maulin, 1973, p. 6).  This 
period is marked by partisan “cleansing” operations against communities occupied by the 
minority party (Safford & Palacios, 2002, p. 348).  During these operations, constituents 
from either faction would attack the minority in their particular area.  Such attacks 
invariably brought retaliation, thus escalating the violence.  In some areas, the Colombian 
Communist Party (CCP) attempted to organize the Liberal groups (Maulin, 1973, pp. 6–
7).  The government never felt the state was in immediate danger, but did consider the 
violence enough of a threat to suspend Congress for two years, the longest interruption in 
the history of Colombia (Safford & Palacios, 2002, p. 350).  This period of violence 
ended in 1953 with an offer of amnesty to all fighters.  Most took advantage of the offer 
but many drifted into other areas of anti-government actions (Maulin, 1973, p. 8). 
The period of 1954 through 1964 marks the second phase, which Safford and 
Palacios term as “mafia violence.”  It is highlighted by the interference of labor on coffee 
farms and land markets utilizing violence as a means of economic enterprise.  The goal of 
the factions was upward social mobility and they sought to achieve it through forcible 
redistribution of land and wealth (Safford & Palacios, 2002, pp. 346–347).  With the Cold 
War in full swing and the Cuban Revolution as an example this period did not really end 
so much as it transformed. 
As this transformation occurred so began the third phase marked by the 
emergence of modern day insurgent groups.  It was during this time that the Ejercito de 
                                                 
8 In Colombia; fragmented land, divided society by Frank Safford and Marco Palacios write that the 
cycles of violence experienced by Colombia are broken down into easy-to-understand events, rather than 
just the Violencia and all else that follows.  This gives a transitional insight to the formations of the various 
groups of this period beginning in 1945 and continuing into the present day. 
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Liberacion Nacional (ELN) and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia 
(FARC) first appeared (Safford & Palacios, 2002, p. 354).  The FARC wanted land 
reform in order to create a society based on the peasant farmer.  Their goal was a peasant 
revolution stylized after the Soviet model.  In response to these growing insurgent threats, 
the Government of Colombia supported by the United States executed Plan LAZO.  
Under Plan LAZO, government forces would primarily utilize civic action programs to 
reach the population (Rempe, 2002).  
During the execution of this program the Colombian army constructed wells, 
instituted literacy programs, developed youth camps, and constructed schools, in addition 
to building clinics.  In doing so, they were able to improve the lives of the populace and 
secure the populace against insurgent activity.  Unfortunately, they did not maintain their 
presence allowing the guerillas to eventually reclaim these territories (Rempe, 2002).  
This failure allowed the fourth phase to begin. 
The last era of Colombian violence begins in 1980 and continues to this day.  It is 
marked by a combination of insurgent warfare and criminal or mafia wars (Safford & 
Palacios, 2002, p. 347).  These guerrillas, drug traffickers and paramilitary squads 
worked by, with, and against one another to further their own goals.  The Cali and 
Medellin Drug Cartels began to ravage the Colombian countryside while the FARC 
sought to overthrow the government.  Homicide rates steadily climbed reaching 95 per 
100,000 by 1993 (Safford & Palacios, 2002, p. 362).  The FARC during this time period 
had split from the CCP and developed its own political and military doctrine, gained more 
public attention and momentum.  More U.S. aid went into Colombia to fight the War on 
Drugs, but little seemed to help.  To stem Colombia’s freefall, Plan Colombia was 
enacted. 
In 1998, the Andres Pastrana government came to power with the intent of 
countering the faltering economy and curbing the ever-rising violence.  Plan Colombia 
originally was to focus on five broad areas; the peace process, the Colombian economy, 
the anti-narcotics strategy, reform of the justice system and protection of human rights 
and democratization and social development (Global Security).  Peace negotiations were 
established with both the FARC and ELN with the creation of a wide de-militarized zone.  
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This included the removal of all government troops from a 16,000-mile area as a show of 
good faith.  Despite the efforts and substantial foreign aid very little was produced 
towards the plan’s overall goals.  This changed after the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks on the United States. 
After the September 11 attacks the United States announced the increase of 
assistance to Colombia to include equipping anti-kidnapping and bomb squads, assisting 
civilian and military counter-terrorism investigators (Global Security).  Pastrana also 
abandoned the fledgling peace process turning the focus now towards counter-terrorism 
efforts and returning Colombian troops to the de-militarized zone.  In early 2002, the 
Colombian people showed their dissatisfaction with the Andres Pastrana government by 
voting Alvaro Uribe into office (Global Security). 
Uribe’s approach to the problems of Colombia would be markedly different and 
show a much stronger stance than his predecessor.  Now there would be no more 
negotiations unless there was an agreed upon cease-fire.  He also wanted to increase both 
the military and police force’s capacity for dealing with Colombia’s terrorist groups.  
Uribe specifically wanted U.S. assistance in reaching his objectives.  Included in that 
assistance were Civil Affairs Teams and Special Forces advisors.  By 2003, there were 
approximately 100 Special Forces advisors training the Colombian army (Simons, 2004, 
p. 246).  Much has changed since Plan Colombia was enacted and modified towards 
counter-insurgency.   
Since 2002, the violence in Colombia has been decreasing and by 2006, 
approximately 31,000 paramilitaries demobilized (CIA World Factbook, 2009).  In 
March of 2008, the leader of the FARC died of a heart attack.  That same month three of 
the seven principle FARC leaders were killed or captured (McDermott, 2008).  
Additionally in 2008, the Colombian Army freed three American hostages in dramatic 
fashion.  Speaking of the improvements and the hostage rescue, Admiral Eric T. Olson 
had this to say: 
For over ten years, U.S. Special Operations Forces have been advising and 
assisting the armed forces of Colombia in the fight against the leftist Fuerzas Armadas 
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Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC).  In recent years, the Colombian armed forces 
have dealt serious blows to that organization, culminating with the recent dramatic and 
brilliant rescue of U.S. and Colombian hostages in 2008 in an operation that was 
completely planned, led and conducted by Colombian forces (Olson, 2009). 
The peace process enacted by Andres Pastrana was not enough to entice the 
insurgent forces to lay down their arms, but it did provide a possible alternative.  This 
alternative combined with the efforts undertaken by Alvaro Uribe and the losses dealt to 
the movements could be the stimulus needed to bring about real change.  The expanded 
capacity and abilities of the Colombian army will assist in dealing with hard liners 
unwilling or unprepared to seek a political.  U.S. intervention in and of itself cannot be 
declared the defining factor, but it did contribute significantly.  These activities gave the 
Colombian army increased capacity for both direct and indirect activities and more 
importantly never overshadowed the government or the indigenous forces.    
An example of this occurred in March of 2009, when a Civil Affairs team from 
the 98th Civil Affairs Battalion coordinated with the Colombian Air Force to provide 
medical assistance to a remote region of the country damaged by recent floods.  With the 
aid of the Colombian government, Colombian Air Force and other agencies the Civil 
Affairs team planned to execute a MEDCAP mission.  The MEDCAP is designed to, 
“bring a non-threatening group that helps the people in the area and that way help 
establish a Colombian military footprint in an area” (Barker, 2009).   
Prior to the actual event, the Civil Affairs team deployed to the area in order to 
assess the area.  These assessments allow the team to meet with local leaders and to 
determine what needs to be provided to the site in terms of doctors and facilities.  The 
team also determines what supplies are needed based on prevalent illnesses in the area.  
Lastly, the team assesses the security environment while there.  All of the information 
gathered is used for planning purposes to ensure the operation both meets the needs of the 
people while maintaining a protective posture for the forces involved.  The government 
treated more than 1,400 people from Malambo with the assistance of the Civil Affairs 
team.  “For many of the patients, it was the only opportunity they would have to see 
specialists like optometrists, gynecologists and dentists,” said Enrique Martin, logistics 
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director, Colombian Civil Air Patrol (Barker, 2009).  A local woman remarked, “I feel 
very good and satisfied with the help on behalf of the Air Force,” (Barker, 2009).  The 
fact she thanked the government tells volumes about how this team properly executed 
their mission.  Not only did they help the local populace, but extended the reach of the 
Colombian government, and bolstered the government’s legitimacy in the region.   
The successes on the ground have also shown how these situations can become 
force multipliers for the United States in terms of coalitions.  According to a recent report 
from CBS news, Colombia has pledged its most elite forces to aid in our ongoing conflict 
in Afghanistan.  These forces owe their creation and training to a small footprint presence 
by U.S. SOF.  Ten years ago, they did not exist (Logan, 2009).  According to General 
Padilla de Leon, Colombia’s top military officer the Colombians could be on the ground 
as soon as August or September.  This impending deployment is remarkable for several 
reasons.  Foremost, it highlights the type of mutual respect and reciprocal relationships 
built through this type of operation.  Secondly, it shows how much a small footprint 
presence of the right forces can accomplish.  Thirdly, it shows that through the 
cumulative efforts of both indigenous forces combined with a highly trained U.S. SOF 
contingent improvement of a country’s situation is possible in a relatively short amount 
of time; improvement to the point that a deployment of forces outside their territorial 
boundaries is possible.  This deployment is something that would have seemed 
inconceivable prior to Plan Colombia’s execution. 
According to U.S. Ambassador William Brownfield, both terrorist attacks and 
kidnappings are also down.  While drug production continues, (Colombia remains the 
number one worldwide producer of cocaine) but even here there have been 
improvements, with production levels down 28% (Logan, 2009).  Ambassador 
Brownfield went further to state in reference to the operations in Colombia, “It has been 
the most successful nation building exercise that the U.S.A. has associated itself with 
perhaps over the last 25-30 years" (Logan, 2009).  While far from finished, this ongoing 
engagement highlights the proper execution of shaping or preventative operations.  Much 
of the Colombian operations are classified, but by Ambassador Brownfiled’s use of the  
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term nation building, and not counterterrorist operations, it can be inferred both Active 
and Reserve Civil Affairs played a significant role in conjunction with other 
governmental agencies. 
In August 2000, when President Clinton arrived in Colombia for meetings with 
President Pastrana, 5,000 protesters greeted him shouting, “Yankee go home” and 
“Imperialism out of Colombia” (Simons, 2004, p. 235).  The United States could not 
achieve its goals, if perceived as either an occupier or usurper of government authority.  
As shown by looking at the case studies of the Philippines, and Colombia, the U.S. 
military can do much more with very little in terms of force structure.  “A few hundred 
Green Berets in Colombia and the Philippines can be adequate force multipliers.  Ten 
thousand troops, as in Afghanistan, can tread water” (Kaplan, 2004).  Each of these cases 
cited by Kaplan includes support from Civil Affairs teams.  In fact, many cite the 
Philippine operation as a possible template for future operations (Barnes, 2009).  Both the 
Philippines and Colombia cases highlight by, with, and through or the indirect over the 
direct approach.   
The United States Special Operations Command’s Contingency Plan 7500 
outlines the framework for the direct and indirect approach.  Admiral Olson speaking of 
this stated:  
The direct approach is urgent, necessary, chaotic and kinetic, and the 
effects are mostly short  term.  However, they are not decisive.  Enduring 
results come from the indirect approaches—those in which we enable 
partners to combat violent extremist organizations themselves by 
contributing to their capabilities (Olson, 2009).   
This effort is long term, “this approach not only builds partner nation capacity and 
regional stability, but it also deters the tacit and active support of sanctuaries that foster 
and develop future terrorists” (Olson, 2009).   
In Colombia, as in the Philippines, this indirect approach was used by Civil 
Affairs teams in the form of construction projects and medical interventions at the local 
level, not for reconstruction but for desired effects.  A Civil Affairs NCO spoke to this 
regarding operations in Colombia by stating: 
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The MEDCAPs (Medical and Civic Assistance Program missions) are the 
best way to access the parts of Colombia that are usually not reached by 
the government or military.  By bringing a non-threatening group that 
helps the people into the area helps establish a Colombian military 
footprint (Barker, 2009).  
Recently, the Center for Strategic & International Studies produced an in depth 
report on Columbia and lessons learned from the United States operations there.  It stated 
that while the problems involved were specific to Colombia many of the factors are 
shared by other countries facing similar circumstances.  Therefore, this model has wider 
applicability (Feickert, 2005, p. 60).  According to the report, the root cause of 
Colombia’s problems was the state’s inability to exercise authority in large areas of the 
country (Feickert, 2005, p. 61).  In other words the Colombian government did not have 
the consent of the governed, the fourth key element of legitimacy.  Support it was 
deemed should be timely (preventive) and sustainable (long-term).  Further, the small 
footprint equated to large gains and proved an asset.  This small footprint negated both 
international and domestic criticisms of the operations taking place and allowed them to 
proceed (Feickert, 2005, p. 69).  In regards to training, it was also important not to 
produce a clone of the U.S. military but one built around its own strengths, attempting to 
counteract its inherent weaknesses (Feickert, 2005, p. 70).  Once referred to as 
Preventative Defense, these operations will gain importance again, due the improving 
capabilities of the U.S. Army, and the constraints of the projected environment (Shelton, 
1997).  The U.S. military can prepare for these challenges by ensuring all Civil Affairs 
forces maintain regional alignment and proper operational placement of these forces, 
which will allow the greatest utility. 
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